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Abstract
Communicating bits over a network is expensive. Therefore, cryptosystems that trans-
mit as little data as possible are valuable. This thesis studies several cryptosystems that
require significantly less bandwidth than conventional analogues. The systems we study,
called torus-based cryptosystems, were analyzed by Karl Rubin and Alice Silverberg in
2003 [RS03]. They interpreted the XTR [LV00] and LUC [SL93] cryptosystems in terms
of quotients of algebraic tori and birational parameterizations, and they also presented
CEILIDH, a new torus-based cryptosystem. This thesis introduces the geometry of alge-
braic tori, uses it to explain the XTR, LUC, and CEILIDH cryptosystems, and presents
torus-based extensions of van Dijk, Woodruff, et al. [vDW04, vDGP+05] that require even
less bandwidth. In addition, a new algorithm of Granger and Vercauteren [GV05] that
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Communicating bits over a network is expensive. Therefore, cryptosystems that transmit
as little data as possible are valuable. However, there is a trade-off: the smaller the amount
of information communicated, the easier it is for an attacker to compromise system security.
This thesis presents a series of cryptosystems that achieve security levels comparable to
“conventional” cryptosystems, while requiring significantly less bandwidth — they transmit
only about 1/3 the bits of traditional analogues1.
A common “conventional” cryptosystem is the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol for
key exchange [DH76, MvOV96]. The Diffie-Hellman protocol operates in a subgroup of
the multiplicative group of a finite field F×qn , and as such transmits elements of F×qn . These
elements can be represented as polynomials in Fq[x] of degree less than n, and these
polynomials can be represented as list of coefficients in Fq. These coefficients are in turn
represented as an integer between 0 and q − 1. It follows that each finite field element
transmitted by the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol requires
n log q
bits to communicate.
The security of the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol relies on the presumed intractabil-
ity of the following computational problem2:
1The cryptosystems presented have low bandwidth requirements, but are all inefficient relative to the
information-theoretic bound.
2More precisely, the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol relies on the Diffie-Hellman problem, but for
1
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Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in a finite field. Let g ∈ F×qn and h ∈ 〈g〉 be
given. The problem is to find an integer x such that h = gx.
Clearly, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is computationally feasible in finite fields
of small size, so in order for the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol to be secure, the bit-size
of the field,
n log q
must be large. Since the textbook Diffie-Hellman protocol transmits finite fields elements,
field sizes large enough to ensure cryptographic security also increase the cost of bandwidth
significantly.
Torus-based cryptosystems improve on conventional cryptosystems by representing
some elements of large finite fields compactly, and therefore they transmit fewer bits.
A working definition of the elements that are compactly represented is:
Working definition of the norm-1 torus. The norm-1 torus Tn(Fq) is the subgroup
of F×qn of order Φn(q), where Φn(x) denotes the n-th cyclotomic polynomial3.
Since
deg Φn(x) = ϕ(n),
where ϕ(n) denotes the Euler totient function, the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq) has order roughly
qϕ(n). Therefore, any representation requires at least
ϕ(n) log q
bits to represent all Tn(Fq).
The XTR cryptosystem [LV00] is an example of a cryptosystem that compactly repre-




bits to represent, but XTR achieves a representation requiring only
2 log q
simplicity we will assume the Diffie-Hellman problem and the discrete logarithm problem are equivalent.
See [MvOV96] for a complete discussion.
3More precisely, Tn(Fq) is the Fq-rational points of the norm-1 torus; see Chapter 2.
1.1. Perspective of this thesis 3
bits. (Note that ϕ(6) = 2.) Using this compact representation, the XTR analogue of
textbook Diffie-Hellman transmits only
1/3
the number of bits that the conventional key agreement scheme transmits. Moreover, the
security of XTR depends on the same DLP in F×qn that textbook Diffie-Hellman depends





bits, while achieving comparable security to the surrounding finite field multiplicative group
F×qn . This reduction in bandwidth costs makes torus-based cryptosystems attractive in
bandwidth constrained environments. (In fact, the results of Granger and Vercauteren,
considered in Chapter 6, show that the systems are closely linked.)
1.1 Perspective of this thesis
We emphasize the geometry of algebraic tori throughout, and, to avoid lengthy exposition,
it is assumed that the reader has some knowledge of algebraic geometry. Specifically, we
assume the reader is familiar with affine varieties, morphisms of varieties, rational maps,
and birational equivalence, and suggest [Ful69, Har95] for reference. The motivation for this
perspective comes from the major conjecture in the study of algebraic tori in cryptography.
Voskresenskii’s Conjecture (Conjecture 4.2) is a geometric question, and we feel it is most
likely that it will be answered with the tools of algebraic geometry. Therefore, we use the
language and elementary techniques of the field without reservation. At the same time, we
have tried to present the ideas simply, which has entailed the loss of some mathematical
rigor.
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1.2 Structure of this thesis
Much of this thesis is devoted to understanding the XTR cryptosystem. The LUC [SL93]
and XTR [LV00] cryptosystems were introduced, in 1993 and 2000 respectively, entirely
in terms of the order Φn(q) subgroup of a finite field F×qn . The interpretation of LUC
and XTR in terms of algebraic tori was given much later, in 2003, by Karl Rubin and
Alice Silverberg [RS03, RS04a]. They recognized that the order Φn(q) subgroup of F×qn
corresponds to the Fq-rational points of a certain geometric object, called a norm-1 torus.
Therefore, the first thing this thesis does is develop the geometry of norm-1 tori. Chapter
2 shows that the order Φn(q) subgroup of F×qn contains the elements of F×qn that have norm4
unity down to every proper subfield of Fqn , and then uses the theory of Weil restriction of
scalars to lift the finite field norm maps that define Tn(Fq) to maps that define an algebraic
variety. Finally, the connection between the order Φn(q) subgroup of F×qn and the literature
surrounding algebraic tori is established.
Using their geometric perspective, Rubin and Silverberg interpreted the LUC and XTR
cryptosystems in terms of maps giving explicit rational parameterizations of special quo-
tients of norm-1 tori. Chapter 3 uses the geometry of norm-1 tori presented in Chapter 2 to
understand this interpretation of XTR5. It exploits the lifted norm maps and the geometric
definition of the order Φ6(q) subgroup of F×q6 to define a group action of S3 on the norm-1
torus T6(Fq) that correspond to the trace map used by XTR, and then explains the role of
the trace map in XTR as a birational parameterization of a quotient of the norm-1 torus.
Rubin and Silverberg also introduced a new cryptosystem, called CEILIDH, based
entirely on birational parameterizations of algebraic tori. Like XTR, CEILIDH represents
elements of T6(Fq) ⊂ F×q6 using only 2 log q bits. Unlike XTR, however, CEILIDH is not
easily understood in terms of finite field arithmetic; a purely geometric development is
most natural. Chapter 4 gives such a presentation of CEILIDH, and shows that rational
norm-1 tori yield compact representations suitable for cryptographic application.
Together, Chapters 3 and 4 explain Figures 1.1 and 1.2, graphically depicting the XTR
and CEILIDH cryptosystems.
The reduction in bandwidth, by a factor of 3, that XTR achieved in 2000, and that
4By norm, we mean the field norm map NL/F (x) =
∏
σ∈Gal(L/F ) σ(x) .
5LUC can be seen as a simplified XTR, so we only present the XTR cryptosystem.
1.2. Structure of this thesis 5a c t i o n o f
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Figure 1.2: The geometry of the CEILIDH cryptosystem is explained in Chapter 4.
CEILIDH matched in 2003, was the best compression ratio known until 2004, when van
Dijk and Woodruff [vDW04] generalized the ideas of CEILIDH. They introduced new
torus-based cryptosystems with protocols that represent elements of F×q30 using only
ϕ(30) log q = 8 log q
bits6. It follows that these cryptosystems achieve the superior compression ratio
30/ϕ(30) = 30/8 = 3.75.
Chapter 5 develops the theory of stably rational tori, a class larger than the class of rational
tori exploited by CEILIDH. We show how these stably rational tori are exploited in the
improved T30 cryptosystem of van Dijk, Woodruff, et al [vDGP
+05] to achieve compression
better than both XTR and CEILIDH.
6The new cryptosystems achieve superior compression ratios as the number of torus elements transmit-
ted tends to infinity; see Chapter 5 for a thorough discussion.
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Chapter 6 embeds the geometry of tori into the world of cryptography, showing how
to use the results of the preceding chapters. Practical issues, such as protocols, parameter
selection, and reductionist security arguments, are considered. Finally, Chapter 6 counters
the constructive uses of tori presented in Chapters 3 through 5 by presenting some of
the first destructive uses of algebraic tori in cryptography. Specifically, the algorithms of
Granger and Vercauteren [GV05] exploiting the rational geometry of norm-1 tori to attack
the DLP in algebraic tori are presented.
We conclude with some open questions and directions for future research in Chapter 7.
1.3 Contributions of this thesis
This thesis synthesizes a large body of published research into a consistent framework,
emphasizing the role of the geometry of tori in cryptography. It does not contain new
results.
It does contain several original examples that help to make the constructions presented
concrete. Many of these examples clarify the bewildering array of notation introduced in
the original research publications, and this exposition will save the reader the effort of
decryption. In addition, Example 4.8 is an original construction of independent value.
The exposition of Chapter 5 sets down most of the proofs omitted in van Dijk et al
[vDGP+05], and provides independent verification of those results.
This thesis also contains many figures graphically detailing the constructed maps, which
help the reader understand the cryptosystems considered. The figures above, which con-
trast the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems, are representative examples, because they
clearly show the key geometric difference between XTR and CEILIDH. We believe these
figures will be of considerable benefit to readers first approaching this material.
Chapter 2
Algebraic tori
In this chapter, we introduce algebraic tori, the mathematical objects that Rubin and
Silverberg use to study the XTR cryptosystem and to construct the CEILIDH cryptosystem
[RS03, RS04a]. We first present three equivalent characterizations of certain algebraic
groups called norm-1 tori, and use these characterizations to better understand norm-1
tori. Then we prove that the groups we call “norm-1 tori” are in fact algebraic tori, a
well-studied class of geometric objects. This gives the geometric insight into norm-1 tori
that Rubin and Silverberg exploit.
This chapter presents much of the material found in [RS03] and [RS04a], but our
presentation differs significantly. Several examples support the material, and overall our





Figure 2.1: We present a geometric interpretation of Tn(Fq), the order Φn(q) subgroup of
F×qn .
7
8 Chapter 2. Algebraic tori
2.1 An algebraic representation of norm-1 tori
Let q be a prime power, and let n be a positive integer. Since the n-th cyclotomic polyno-
mial Φn(q) divides |F×qn| = qn − 1, there always exists a subgroup of F×qn of order Φn(q).
Definition 2.1. Let Gq,n be the order Φn(q) subgroup of F×qn.
We call Gq,n the primitive subgroup of Fqn , since we later show that Gq,n does not
embed into any proper subfield of F×qn (Theorem 6.2).
Observe that the subgroup used in the XTR cryptosystem is the special case Gq,6 with
n = 6 [LV00]; henceforth, we will consider the general case with n not necessarily 6.
The following theorem describes the norm-1 torus algebraically, equating it with the
primitive subgroup Gq,n.
Theorem 2.2. [RS03, Lemma 7] (Algebraic characterization of the norm-1 torus.) Define
the set of elements of norm 1 down to every proper subfield to be
Tn(Fq) = {x ∈ F×qn : NFqn/Fqd (x) = 1 for each d|n, d < n}.
Then Tn(Fq) = Gq,n.
Proof. For each d|n, the subfield norm map is a multiplicative homomorphism, from which
it follows that Tn(Fq) is a subgroup of F×qn . Since F×qn is a cyclic group, the theorem will
follow if we show Tn(Fq) has group order Φn(q). Let c denote |Tn(Fq)|. For a subfield Fqd ,
the Galois group Gal(Fqn/Fqd) is generated by the d-th power Frobenius map x 7→ xq
d
, and
thus for x ∈ Tn(Fq), we have that
NFqn/Fqd (x) = x
qd · xq2d · · ·xqn = x(qn−1)/(qd−1) = 1.





: d|n and d < n
}
.
Recalling the decomposition xm − 1 =
∏
e|m Φe(x) [LN94, Theorem 2.45], we see that
c|Φn(q).
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for a proof, consult [dB53, Theorem 1], or [Sch64, Theorem 2]. It follows that Φn(q)| gcd{(qn−
1)/(qd − 1) : d|n and d < n}. But this means Φn(q)|c, and thus c = Φn(q). It follows that
Tn(Fq) = Gq,n.
We have shown that the subgroup Gq,n of order Φn(q) is the collection of finite field
elements that satisfy the strong algebraic “norm-1” property. We call Tn(Fq) the norm-1
torus partly because all its elements have norm unity down to each subfield, but we must
wait until Section 2.4 to understand why we call Tn(Fq) a “torus”. However, we have
provided our first representation of norm-1 tori.
2.2 Weil restriction of scalars
Now that we have demonstrated an algebraic characterization of the primitive subgroup
of F×qn , we turn to providing a geometric characterization. First, we study the process of
“restriction of scalars”, and then we introduce geometric norm and trace maps that allow
Rubin and Silverberg to identify the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq) with an algebraic variety.
In this section, let L be a finite separable extension of k. Consider an algebraic variety
V defined over L. To what extent does the large field L determine the variety V ? Is there
a variety defined over the small field k that is, in some sense, equivalent to V ? André
Weil asked if there is a variety W defined over k such that V is birational to W , and he
answered his question affirmatively in [Wei58]. Figure 2.2 depicts the situation.
We denote the restricted variety W by ResL/k V , and we say that ResL/k V is the “Weil
restriction of scalars of V from L down to k”, or, if there is no ambiguity, just the “Weil
restriction of V ”. (For an exposition in the language of schemes, see [Vos98, Section 3.12].)
2.2.1 Definitions
First, the following varieties are fundamental.
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Figure 2.2: W is the “restriction of scalars from L to k” of V .





To consider the properties of the Weil restriction variety ResL/k V , we need some nota-
tion.





where ⊕ denotes direct sum: A⊕B = {(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
Remark 2.5. We notate an element x ∈ V G as
x = (. . . , xσ, xτ , . . .) = (xe, σ(xσ), τ(xτ ), . . .) = (xσ)σ∈G,
where each element xσ is a distinct point in the variety V (and thus may have multiple
components itself). To be clear, xσ is not necessarily equal to xτ .
We understand σ and τ to range over G in the first and second notations.
Finally, observe that V G is itself a variety.
This notation makes it easy to discuss Galois actions, because there is natural group
action defined on V G that can be interpreted as a Galois action.
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Definition 2.6. If G is a group, G acts on V G by permuting indices.
For example, if G = {e, g, g2} is the cyclic group of order three and V is a variety, then
g(xe, xg, xg2) = (xeg, xgg, xgg2) = (xg, xg2 , xe) ∈ V G.
Definition 2.7. Let L extend the field k. Denote the Galois group of L over k by
Gal(L/k).
The following theorem, a modification of a theorem stated by Rubin and Silverberg,
provides the technical tools we need.
Theorem 2.8. [RS04a, Proposition 2.2] Let L/k be a finite Galois extension with Galois
group G = Gal(L/k). Let V be an affine variety defined over L. Then there exists an
affine variety ResL/k V defined over the base field k such that
i. there is a bijection between the sets of points
(ResL/k V )(k)
∼−→V (L);
ii. there are projections
πσ : ResL/k V −→ V,
for each σ ∈ G, with each πσ a morphism defined over L, such that the direct sum
⊕πσ : ResL/k V
∼−→V G
is an isomorphism defined over L;
iii. there is a group action of G on ResL/k V that is compatible with the isomorphism above,
ie there is a commutative diagram
ResL/k V
∼−→ V G
G ↓ ↓ G
ResL/k V
∼−→ V G
with the left vertical map the natural action of G point-wise on ResL/k V , and the right
vertical map the action of G on V G described in Definition 2.4.
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2.2.2 The realification of the complex numbers
Let us consider some of the details of Theorem 2.8. We motivate the first part of the
theorem by considering the “realification” of the complex numbers, which we consider as
the affine variety A1(C). We seek a variety W = ResC/R A1 such that the C-rational points
A1(C) are isomorphic to the R-rational points W (R). This perspective is natural: we
normally express a complex number z in terms of the basis {1, i}, so that z = a+ bi, with
both components a and b real numbers and i a square root of −1. Therefore, we normally
identify the complex numbers with two copies of the real numbers. Hence, A1(C) = A2(R),
and it is clear that A1 over C is isomorphic to W = A2 over R (the isomorphism being
defined over C).
The fundamental step in the identification above is fixing a basis for C as an extension
of R, and this identification generalizes to finite extensions of a base field. (We do not
consider extensions that are not finitely generated.) Let us push further. Consider an
affine variety V presented as the zero locus of a set (finite, by the Hilbert Basis Theorem
[J99, Theorem 6.3.5]) of polynomial equations. Suppose that V is defined over L, a finite
extension of k, and that {α1, . . . , αj} is a basis for L over k. Then for each point
(x1, . . . , xr) ∈ V
in the variety V , there is a unique decomposition
(c11α1 + c12α2 + · · ·+ c1jαj, . . . , cr1α1 + cr2α2 + · · ·+ crjαj) ∈ V
inherited from the underlying field. We use this decomposition to construct a variety W
with the desired properties by considering the polynomial equations defining V as equations
relating the basis elements αi. The following example clarifies.
Example 2.9. Consider the variety V = V (z2 + 1), and let L = C and k = R. In this
case, we have V (C) = {i,−i}. We seek a variety W such that V (C) ∼= W (R). Fixing the
standard basis {1, i} of C over R, we write an element of V as z = a+ bi, with both a and
b real. The equation z2 + 1 = 0 can be written as (a+ bi)(a+ bi) + 1 = 0, which expands
to the simultaneous equations
a2 − b2 + 1 = 0
2ab = 0.
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Denote by W the zero locus of these equations. Since 2ab = 0, one of a and b is 0. If b = 0,
there are no real solutions to a2+1 = 0; if a = 0, there are two solutions, b = 1 and b = −1.
Thus W (R) = {(0, 1), (0,−1)}, and we can identify (0, 1) ←→ i and (0,−1) ←→ −i, as
expected.
The bijections between V (C) and W (R) are:
V (C) −→ W (R)
a+ bi 7−→ (a, b)
W (R) −→ V (C)
(a, b) 7−→ a+ bi.
Remark 2.10. We make the following observations. First, the bijections are defined over
the complex numbers; second, the maps depend on the choice of basis for L over k; and
third, the maps between V (C) and W (R) are the restriction of the maps between A1(C)
and A2(R) discussed earlier.
Example 2.11. Consider the restriction of scalars, from F23 down to F2, of the variety
Gm. For concreteness, let w be a solution to t3 + t+ 1 = 0 over F2, so that {1, ω, ω2} is a
basis for F23 over F2.
The variety Gm can be represented as the zero locus V (xy = 1). With this description,




(ω, ω2 + 1), (ω + 1, ω2 + ω), (ω2 + ω + 1, ω2),
(ω2 + 1, ω), (ω2 + ω, ω + 1), (ω2, ω2 + ω + 1)
 .
Expressing x = x0 +ωx1 +ω
2x2 and y = y0 +ωy1 +ω
2y2, the equation xy = 1 is equivalent
to (x0 + ωx1 + ω
2x2)(y0 + ωy1 + ω
2y2) = 1. (Each coefficient xi, yi is in F2.) This system
is equivalent to the following system of equations that compares powers of ω:
x0y0 + x2y1 + x1y2 = 1
x1y0 + x0y1 + x2y1 + x1y2 + x2y2 = 0
x2y0 + x1y1 + x0y2 + x2y2 = 0.
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The solution set, over F2, is:
(ResF23/F2 Gm)(F2) =

((1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0)),
((0, 1, 0) , (1, 0, 1)) , ((1, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 1)) , ((1, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 1)) ,
((1, 0, 1) , (0, 1, 0)) , ((0, 1, 1) , (1, 1, 0)) , ((0, 0, 1) , (1, 1, 1))
 ,




2.2.3 Weil restriction and Galois actions
The second and third parts of Theorem 2.8 describe an isomorphism between the Weil
restriction of V and several copies of V [Wei58]. We now consider this perspective.
Let G = Gal(L/k). We will show that the set V G has a natural interpretation as the
variety V and its Galois conjugates. For an element σ of G, we will sometimes write the
Galois conjugates, under the action of σ, of the points of the variety V as
V σ = {σ(x) : x ∈ V } .









Thus Theorem 2.8 is telling us that the Weil restriction of scalars ResL/k V is managing the
Galois conjugates of V . Since the Galois conjugates of V are determined by the extension
L over k, ResL/k V is encoding the structure of the underlying fields of definition, as well
as the interplay between them and the variety V .
To demonstrate this “structure encoding”, let us continue the “realification” of the
complex numbers that we began in Section 2.2.2. (For an exposition in the language of
schemes, see [Vos98, p. 40].)
Example 2.12. Let L = C and k = R, and consider the variety V = A1. Theorem 2.8
tells us that
ResC/R A1 ∼= AG,
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with G = Gal(C/R). Since G = {e, σ}, with σ the automorphism of C fixing R and
mapping i to −i, we can view ResC/R V as V ⊕ V σ. Recall that the R-rational points of
ResC/R V are precisely those fixed by the Galois action of G. Since the natural action of
G on V G is equivalent to the action of G on V as a variety, we can describe the set of
fixed points explicitly. A point (u, σ(v)) ∈ V ⊕V σ corresponds to a point in (ResC/R V )(R)
exactly when σ(u, σ(v)) = (u, σ(v)). The action of σ on V G permutes the factors, so
σ(u, σ(v)) = (σ(v), u) = (σ(v), σ(σ(u))),
where the action of σ is applied twice to u in the second equality to express (σ(v), σ(σ(u)))
as an element of V ⊕ V σ. Thus, an element (u, σ(v)) is fixed by σ if and only if u = σ(v),
and there are natural bijections of sets
(ResC/R V )(R)
∼−→{(u, σ(u)) : u ∈ V (C)} ∼−→{(u, u) : u ∈ V (C)} ∼−→V (C).
We see that the R-rational points of ResC/R V correspond exactly to the pairs consisting
of a C-rational point of V and its Galois conjugate.
Example 2.12 shows that the representation of a variety via the Weil restriction of
scalars provides a natural notation for reasoning about Galois actions on varieties. Let us
consider another case to gain familiarity. This time, we consider the natural Galois action
on the Weil restriction constructed in Example 2.11.
Example 2.13. Let G denote Gal(F23/F2), and denote the 2-Frobenius σ. Recall that the
points of GGm are the triples{
(xe, σ(xσ), σ
2(xσ2)) : xe, xσ, xσ2 ∈ Gm
}
.
Observe that, since xe is not necessarily equal to xσ, we have
|GGm(F23)| = |Gm(F23)|3 = 73.
A point x in GGm is F2-rational exactly when it is fixed by G, which means that
x = σ(x) = σ2(x),
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or, when expressed as permuted tuples in GGm,
(xe, σ(xσ), σ
2(xσ2)) = (σ
2(xσ2), xe, σ(xσ)) = (σ(xσ), σ
2(xσ2), xe),







2(σ2(xσ))) = (σ(xσ), σ(σ(xσ2)), σ
2(σ(xe))).
Equating components, we see that
xe = σ
2(xσ2) = σ(xσ),
and thus the point x ∈ GGm is F2-rational if it is of the form
x = (xe, xe, xe),
with xe ∈ Gm(F23). Thus the bijection of sets follows:
GGm(F2)
∼−→Gm(F23).
So far, we have considered the bijection between (ResL/k V )(k) and V (L), and certain
aspects of the isomorphism between ResL/k V and V
G. Unfortunately, the isomorphism of
Theorem 2.8 (ii) depends on the set of distinct embeddings of L into the algebraic closure
k̄ of k [Wei58], and a complete exposition would lead us far afield. However, we can still
use Theorem 2.8, and we do so to lift the norm maps that define the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq)
over a finite field to maps that act on a general variety.
2.3 Norm maps and a geometric representation of
norm-1 tori
In this section, we present the norm and trace maps of Rubin and Silverberg that lift NL/F
and TrL/F to algebraic varieties. First, for each subfield k ⊆ F ⊆ L, we seek maps NL/F
and TrL/F that make the following diagrams commute:
L
∼−→ AGal(L/k)(k)
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(We use the notation NL/F and TrL/F to remind the reader that these maps are defined
over AG for suitable groups G.)
Remark 2.14. Our larger goal is to present a variety TFqn that is a geometric equivalent
of Tn(Fq). This variety has points defined over the algebraic closure F̄q, whereas we have
defined Tn(Fq) to be a subset of F×qn . Some of our results yield full isomorphisms over F̄q:
for example,
TFqn ∼= TGal(Fqn/Fq).
However, in some cases we present only a bijection
Tn(Fq)
∼−→TFqn (Fq),
because we can reason more simply about an explicit map. These maps are the content of
Theorem 2.8. For more, see Remarks 2.18 and 2.21.
2.3.1 Group theoretic norm maps
We develop geometric norm maps with the aid of norm maps given in terms of Galois
groups. Recall that in Section 2.2, we showed that A1(L) can be interpreted as the k-
rational points of the Weil restriction ResL/k A1. The same holds for an arbitrary subfield
k ⊆ F ⊆ L: A1(L) can be interpreted as the F -rational points of the Weil restriction
ResL/F A1. Thus we can consider any subfield k ⊆ F ⊆ L without loss of generality.
For each subfield k ⊆ F ⊆ L, we fix an explicit map between the F -rational points
(ResL/F A1)(F ) and a subset of the tuples in AGal(L/F ), as per Example 2.12, and use this
identification to build norm maps.
Definition 2.15. Define injections by
ιL/F : A1 −→ AGal(L/F )
ιL/F (x) −→ (x, σ(x), . . .) = (xe, xσ, . . .) = (σ(x))σ∈Gal(L/F )
and
ιF/k : A1 −→ AGal(F/k)
ιF/k(x) −→ (x, σ(x), . . .) = (xe, xσ, . . .) = (σ(x))σ∈Gal(F/k)
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The injections ιL/F and ιF/k are trivial, but we emphasize that they are defined over
the algebraic closure k̄ of k.
Suppose x is an element of L, which we view as A1(L). Then it is easy to see that the





can be expressed equivalently as





NL/F (x) = nL/F (ιL/F (x)).
The map nL/F mixes representations, mapping tuples of Galois conjugates to finite field
elements, and we address this in the following manner. The representation AG is really
encoding information about the group G; let us maintain consistency and define our norm
maps in terms of subgroups H of G (for appropriate Galois groups G). Observe that this
is reasonable for field norm maps, because Gal(L/F ) is a subgroup of Gal(L/k). Rubin
and Silverberg make the following definition.
Definition 2.16. [RS04a, Section 2] Let H be a subgroup of an abelian group G. Define
a norm map NH by







To gain familiarity with Definition 2.16, we consider a concrete example.
Example 2.17. Let L = Fq6 , let F = Fq2 , and let k = Fq. Denote by σ the q-Frobenius,
so that
G = Gal(Fq6/Fq) = {e, σ, σ2, σ3, σ4, σ5}
and
H = Gal(Fq6/Fq2) = {e, σ2, σ4}.
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Let x be an element of L. Then
NFq6/Fq2 (x) = xσ
2(x)σ4(x) ∈ Fq2 ,
and, using our injection ιL/F ,














xσ2(x)σ4(x), σ(x)σ3(x)σ5(x)) ∈ AGal(F/k).
The resulting element of AGal(F/k) corresponds, by the map ιF/k, to the finite field element
xσ2(x)σ4(x) ∈ F , which is precisely NFq6/Fq2 (x). Thus, the group theoretic norm map
corresponds to the finite field norm map for elements in the field L.
Remark 2.18. It is important to note that the group theoretic norm maps NG are defined
for points in extension fields of L. Even though we rarely consider this explicitly, our
argument that Tn is an algebraic torus (Theorem 2.36) does use this fact. (For more, see
Remarks 2.14 and 2.21.)
In general, the equivalence of NGal(L/F ) and NL/F follows from the Fundamental Cor-
respondence of Galois Theory [J99, Theorem 9.6.6]. The following theorem summarizes.
Theorem 2.19. [RS04a, Section 2] Let k ⊆ F ⊆ L be Galois extensions of fields. We
have the following commutative diagram:
L ↪−→ AGal(L/k)
NL/F ↓ ↓ NGal(L/F ).
F ↪−→ AGal(F/k)
We have invested this effort in equivalent group theoretic norm maps because they
permit a second characterization of the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq): in particular, we achieve a
characterization that captures the role of the Galois group of Gal(Fqn/Fq).
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Definition 2.20. [RS04a, Section 2] (Group-theoretic definition of the norm-1 torus.) Let












⊕NH (x) = (NH(x))1 6=H⊆G = (. . . ,NH(x),NJ(x), . . .).








x ∈ GGm : NH(x) = (1)σ∈H for every nontrivial subgroupH of G
}
.
Remark 2.21. With reference to Remarks 2.14 and 2.18, we note that TG ⊂ AG is a
variety with points over the algebraic closure k̄.
Observe that the equivalence of norm maps shown by Theorem 2.19 also demonstrates
that there is a natural identification
TGal(Fqn/Fq)(Fq)
∼−→Tn(Fq).
To complete this section on group-theoretic norm maps, we will use them to present a
simpler characterization of TG (and hence of Tn). The intuition is that the norm maps NH
are determined by the primes dividing |H|, and that the power of each prime dividing |H|
is irrelevant. In other words, the norm of an element in AG is determined completely by
its norm relative to each prime order subgroup H of G.
Definition 2.22. Denote by CN the cyclic group of order N .
Lemma 2.23. [RS04a, Proposition 2.6] Let pa be the largest power of p that divides |G|.
Let β be an element of AG. Then NCp(β) = 1 implies that NCpk (β) = 1 for every 1 6 k 6 a.
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Proof. Let g generate Cpa , so that g
pa−k generates Cpk for each 1 6 k 6 a. By assumption,

























































where we have used the induction hypothesis (applied to the coset representative xgrp
a−k−1
)
to establish the final equality. The claim follows.
Remark 2.24. The reader may have observed that Lemma 2.23 is merely an encoding of
the following observation for finite fields. For simplicity, let us work a concrete example.
Consider Fq8 , and let Gal(Fq8/Fq) = 〈σ〉. Then
NFq8/Fq2 (x) = xσ
2(x)σ4(x)σ6(x) = (xσ4(x))σ2(xσ4(x)).
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It follows that if NFq8/Fq4 (x) = xσ
4(x) = 1, then NFq8/Fq2 (x) = 1. In terms of Galois groups,
the norm relative to the subgroup of order 2, Gal(Fq8/Fq4), determined the norm relative
to the subgroup of order 22, Gal(Fq8/Fq2). Thus, this example connects the equivalent
formulation of Lemma 2.23 with the algebraic properties of the finite field Fqn .
Lemma 2.23 establishes the following elegant characterization of TG.













cyclic, and having prime power order. Then two equivalent characterizations of
the norm-1 torus TG are
TG = {β ∈ GGm : NCpi (β) = (1)σ∈G/Cpi for every index 1 6 i 6 t}
and
TG = {β = (βσ)σ∈G :
∏
τ∈Cpi
βστ = 1 for every elementσ ∈ G and index 1 6 i 6 t}.
These equivalent formulations reward our search for alternative definitions of the torus.
Definition 2.25 is a fundamental piece of Rubin and Silverberg’s proof that Tn is an
algebraic torus (Theorem 2.36), but first we will show how they used this perspective to
develop geometric norm maps.
2.3.2 Geometric norm maps
This section parallels the previous section, but has loftier goals. Not only do we seek
geometric norm maps, we seek an entire family of geometric symmetric maps, of which
the norm and the trace are the extreme members. (The name “symmetric map” is chosen
because the maps are invariant under permutations of their arguments, like the symmetric
polynomials.) The additional symmetric maps we present will feature prominently in
Chapter 3.
We adopt a notational convention: varieties written in calligraphic typeface are Weil
restrictions of the corresponding variety. (Scalars are always restricted to k, the base field.)
Definition 2.26. Denote the Weil restriction of affine space by
AF := ResF/k A1
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and the Weil restriction of the multiplicative subgroup by
GF := ResF/k Gm.
With this notation, we seek maps that make the following diagrams commute:
L
∼−→ AL(k)






TrL/F ↓ ↓ T rL/F .
F
∼−→ AF (k)
(Again, we use the notation NL/F and T rL/F to remind the reader that these maps are
defined relative to AL and AF .)
Let k ⊆ F ⊆ L be finite Galois extensions, and let G = Gal(L/k). Let H = Gal(L/F ),
and note that H is a subgroup of G; denote the index of H in G by ` = [G : H].
We need some notation.
Definition 2.27. Let si denote the i-th symmetric polynomial, where the number of inde-
terminates is implicit.
Now we can define the symmetric maps.
Definition 2.28. [RS04a, Equation (2.1)] For each index 1 6 i 6 `, define symmetric
maps Si,F by the composition
Si,F : ResL/F A1
∼−→AGal(L/F ) −→ A1,
where the isomorphism on the left is provided by Theorem 2.8 (ii), and the map on the
right is the i-th symmetric polynomial si of the ` projection maps
πσ : AGal(L/F ) −→ A1
for each σ ∈ G, also provided by Theorem 2.8 (ii).
In other words, the map Si,F is





The following theorem shows that the maps Si,F lift the finite field norm maps.
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Theorem 2.29. [RS04a, Proposition 2.3] Let k ⊆ F ⊆ L be a finite Galois extension of
fields, and let Si,F be as in Definition 2.28. Then
i. the maps Si,F are defined over F , and
ii. for each 1 6 i 6 `, there is a commutative diagram
(ResL/F A1)(F )
∼−→ L
Si,F ↓ ↓ si,F
A1(F ) ∼−→ F
,
where si,F (x) is the i-th symmetric polynomial evaluated on the set of Galois conjugates
of x over the subfield F :
si,F (x) = si((τ(x))τ∈Gal(L/F )
)
.
Proof. The maps Si,F are clearly invariant under the action of Gal(L/F ), which means




(σ(x))σ∈Gal(L/F ) : x ∈ A1(L)
}
,
and the injection ιL/F : (ResL/F A1)(F )
∼−→L of Definition 2.15 takes x 7−→ (σ(x))σ∈Gal(L/F ).
Evaluating the top and bottom maps shows that the diagram commutes.
Observe that ResF/k ResL/F A1 ∼= ResL/k A1, so for each subfield F ⊆ L, we can compose
the symmetric maps Si,F and Weil restriction to obtain maps
Si,F : AL −→ AF .
The preceding theorem explains why we call S`,F the norm from L down to F , and
S1,F the trace of L over F . The following definition uses most of the interpretations at our
disposal.
Definition 2.30. [RS04a, Section 2] Define
NL/F : AL −→ AF
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and
T rL/F : AL −→ AF




Now that we have presented the lifted norm maps of Rubin and Silverberg, a geometric
description of the torus is immediate.
Definition 2.31. [RS04a, Definition 2.4] Let TL be the intersection of the kernels of the


















x ∈ GL : NL/F (x) = 1 ∈ AF for every subfield k ⊆ F ( L
}
.
Theorem 2.29 shows that the Fq-rational points of TFqn are precisely
TFqn (Fq) =
{
x ∈ GFqn (Fq) : NFqn/F (x) = 1 for each Fq ⊆ F ( Fqn
}
.
Now, recall the algebraic characterization of the norm-1 torus given by Theorem 2.2:
Tn(Fq) = {x ∈ Fqn : NFqn/F (x) = 1 for each Fq ⊆ F ( Fqn}.
Clearly, we have a bijection
TFqn (Fq)
∼−→Tn(Fq).
Rubin and Silverberg extend this bijection to an isomorphism, which follows from our
discussion.
Theorem 2.32. [RS04a, Section 2] There exists an isomorphism of algebraic groups
TFqn ∼= TGal(Fqn/Fq).
Finally, we have achieved a geometric definition of the norm-1 torus!
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2.4 Algebraic tori
In this section, we explain why we call Tn(Fq) a torus. Before doing this, however, we
remark upon the cryptographic consequences of the previous sections.
Remark 2.33. At this point, it is important to note that our geometric definition of
Tn(Fq) could be exploited to achieve compression in cryptographic protocols. If there is an
effectively computable birational embedding
ρ : TFqn ↪−→A
d
for some integer d strictly less than n, we have achieved a compact representation of Tn(Fq),
because we usually are only able to embed TFqn in An. That is, x ∈ TFqn (Fq) ⊂ An(Fq)
requires
n log q
bits to represent, but ρ(x) ∈ ρ(TFqn (Fq)) ⊂ Ad(Fq) requires only
d log q
bits to represent.
However, even our geometric definition of TFqn does not make it clear that such an
embedding of TFqn exists, much less lead us to find such an embedding explicitly! To
explain why we expect TFqn to be embeddable in an affine space of dimension d < n, we
interpret TFqn as an algebraic torus and call upon the extensive literature studying these
objects.
We begin by defining, in some generality, algebraic tori.
Definition 2.34. Let k be a field, and let ks be a fixed separable closure of k. Let V be a
commutative algebraic group defined over k, so that V is an algebraic variety equipped with
two morphisms ⊕ : V × V → V and 	 : V → V which make V a group.
We call an algebraic group V an algebraic torus if there exists a morphism of vari-
eties V → Gdm, defined over the closure ks, for some positive integer d, that is also an
isomorphism of groups.
If k ⊆ L ⊆ ks and V is isomorphic to Gdm over L, we say that L splits the torus V .
2.4. Algebraic tori 27
Remark 2.35. Isomorphisms of algebraic groups are not the same as isomorphisms of
groups, because in the former the maps must be morphisms of varieties.
It is immediate that Gdm is an algebraic torus for each positive integer d, but we are
also in a position to give non-trivial examples of algebraic tori. Consider the variety
GL = ResL/k Gm; the isomorphism of Theorem 2.8 (ii) gives that GL ∼= GGal(L/k)m , and it
is clear that this means GL ∼= G|Gal(L/k)|m . Thus GL is an algebraic torus split by L; the
dimension of GL as a variety is trivially |Gal(L/k)|.
Rubin and Silverberg show that in certain cases, the variety TL is an algebraic torus.
In particular, the variety TFqn over a finite field Fq is an algebraic torus for all integers n.
This is the result that enables our entire study of tori in cryptography.
In fact, this result actually shows more than just the finite field case TFqn . The result
is that if Gal(L/k) is cyclic, then TL is an algebraic torus of dimension ϕ(n) split by L. Of
course, since we are primarily interested in finite fields, we are not limited by restricting
to field extensions with cyclic Galois groups.
Rubin and Silverberg state that the isomorphism identifying AL and AGal(L/k) is the









Figure 2.3: The horizontal maps are restrictions of the one isomorphism of Theorem 2.8
(ii).
We exploit this equivalence in the proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 2.36. [RS04a, Proposition 2.6] Suppose G is cyclic. Write G =
∏t
i=1Gi with
each subgroup Gi cyclic of prime-power order p
ai
i , and each pi 6= pj when i 6= j. For
each index i, let Hi denote the cyclic subgroup of Gi or order pi, and fix a set Ci of coset
representatives of the quotient Gi/Hi. Let Γi = Gi − Ci and define Γ =
∏t
i=1 Γi. Then
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there is a composition
TG↪−→GGm  GΓm
that is an isomorphism.
Proof. We construct a map ψ : GΓm → TG as follows. Consider an element α ∈ GΓm, and
write
α = (αg)g∈G.
For each element g ∈ G, express g as a direct product g = γ1 · · · γt, with each γi in the
prime-power cyclic subgroup Gi. We show that we can “avoid” a single element in each
subgroup Gi, namely the distinguished coset representative. Let Ig = {i : γi ∈ Ci} be the
set of indices of factors γi that have been distinguished as coset representatives, and let
Dg =
∏
i∈Cg(Hi−{1}) be the direct product of the non-trivial elements of the prime cyclic
subgroups Hi. The intuition is that Ig is the set of indices of the elements g that are not
in Γ, and Dg is the corresponding set of Galois conjugates.






We have gτ ∈ Γ for every τ ∈ Dg, for suppose j ∈ Ig corresponds to a factor γj that is
not a coset representative: then τ has a factor from Hj − {1} and the product gτ has no
factor in Cj. Also, for each g ∈ Γ, we have every factor γi ∈ Γi, so that the index set Ig is
empty, the conjugate set Dg is the single element set {1}, and the product βg is just αg.
We claim that the constructed element β is in the torus TG. Fix a g in G and write g
as a direct product g = γ1 · · · γt, and fix an index j with 1 6 j 6 t. By the definition of Cj,
there is a unique coset representative cj ∈ Cj such that cj ∈ Hjγj. Let ηj = cjγ−1j ∈ Hj.
Now consider an element δ ∈ Hj − {ηj}; from the factor decomposition of gδ, we see that
Igηj = Igδ ∪ {j}, and that Dgηj = Dgδ × (Hj − {1}). Observe that Dgδ is independent of
2.4. Algebraic tori 29

































θ∈Hj βgθ = 1 for each element g ∈ G and each 1 6 j 6 t, so by our
simplifying Lemma 2.23, β = (βg)g∈G ∈ TG, as claimed.
The map ψ : GΓm −→ TG is injective, for suppose two distinct elements of GΓm, say
x = (xγ)γ∈Γ and y = (yγ)γ∈Γ, map to the same element:
ψ(x) = ψ(y) = b = (bg)g∈G.
Consider the element z = (x−1γ yγ)γ∈Γ; by assumption, there is a γ ∈ Γ with x−1γ yγ 6= 1.





(−1)|Ig | = ψ(x)−1g ψ(y)g = b
−1
g bg = 1.
But, using the observation made above, for γ ∈ Γ we have ψ(x)γ = xγ, and thus ψ(z)γ = 1
for every γ ∈ Γ. This contradicts x−1γ yγ 6= 1, and x 6= y; it follows that ψ is injective.
Now we show that ψ : GΓm −→ TG is surjective. Suppose x = (xg)g∈G is an element of
TG. Without loss of generality, we can assume that xγ = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ. We will show
that xg = 1 for every g ∈ G. Then, since ψ preserves the indices γ, meaning
ψ((xγ)γ∈Γ)γ = xγ,
and since ψ((xγ)γ∈Γ) ∈ TG, it will follow that ψ is surjective.
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We prove xg = 1 for every g ∈ G by induction on |Ig|. Again, write each element g ∈ G
as a direct product g = γ1 · · · γt, with each γi in the prime-power cyclic subgroup Gi. If
|Ig| = 0, then γi ∈ Γi for every index i, so g ∈ Γ and βg = 1 by assumption. If |Iγ| = r > 1,








If τ ∈ Hj − {1}, then we have γjτ ∈ Γj and thus |Igτ | 6 r − 1. Therefore, by induction,
we have βgτ = 1 for every τ ∈ Hj − {1}. It follows that βg = 1 for every g ∈ G.
We conclude that the map ψ : GΓm
∼−→TG is a bijection. Since the group operation on
GΓm is component-wise multiplication, it is straightforward to verify that ψ preserves the
group structure of TG.
Finally, the map ψ−1 : TG
∼−→GΓm is an isomorphism.





and thus an inclusion
Tn(Fq) ⊂ Fϕ(n)q .
However, this is not correct. Theorem 2.36 is a statement about the group structure of
the norm-1 torus, while Remark 2.33 is a statement about the geometric structure of the
norm-1 torus. While Theorem 2.36 does strongly suggest that such an embedding exists,
it does not provide one. (One possible problem is that it is not immediate that the maps
suggested by the proof are well-defined rational functions.)
However, for some tori Tn the embedding suggested by Theorem 2.36 exists; we will
present some explicit examples in Chapter 4.
2.5 Summary of results
We summarize the major results of this chapter for easy reference.
We presented three representations of the norm-1 torus:
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• We gave an algebraic representation, Tn(Fq) ⊂ Fqn with norm NFqn/Fqd (Theorem
2.2);
• We gave a group theoretic representation, TGal(Fqn/Fq) ⊂ AGal(Fqn/Fq) with norm
NGal(Fqn/Fqd ) (Definition 2.20);
• And we gave a geometric interpretation, TFqn ⊂ AFqn with norm NFqn/Fqd (Definition
2.31).
Finally, we used these representations to prove that Tn is an algebraic torus (Theorem
2.36).
Our task now is to apply these results to the XTR cryptosystem.
Chapter 3
Quotients of algebraic tori and XTR
In this chapter, we show how Rubin and Silverberg use the results of Chapter 2 to un-
derstand the XTR cryptosystem of Lenstra and Verheul [LV00]. Rubin and Silverberg’s
goal was to extend the XTR cryptosystem to the next largest cryptographically interesting
field extension [RS03, RS04a], but before we can explain the desired extension, we need to
introduce the XTR cryptosystem.
3.1 The algebra of XTR
Let L = Fq6 extend k = Fq, and let F = Fq2 be the quadratic subfield of L. Let H =
Gal(L/F ), and denote the q-Frobenius map by σ, so that we have
H = Gal(L/F ) = {e, σ2, σ4}.
The XTR cryptosystem exploits the following fact.
Theorem 3.1. [LV00, Lemma 2.2.1] Let g be an element of the torus T6(F̄q). Then
TrL/F (g) determines the characteristic polynomial of g over F .
Proof. The characteristic polynomial χ(t) of g over F is
χ(t) = (t− g)(t− σ2(g))(t− σ4(g))
= t3 − t2(g + σ2(g) + σ4(g)) + t(gσ2(g) + σ2(g)σ4(g) + gσ4(g))− gσ2(g)σ4(g)).
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Now, g ∈ T6(F̄q) means that NL/F = gσ2(g)σ4(g) = 1 and NL/Fq3 (g) = gσ
3(g) = 1, and









= σ(g) + σ5(g) + σ3(g) = σ(TrL/F (g)),
so
χ(t) = t3 − TrL/F (g)t2 + σ(TrL/F (g))t− 1.
Thus, all the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial χ(t) of g are determined by the
trace TrL/F (g).
Theorem 3.1 allows the XTR cryptosystem to represent elements x of T6(Fq) by their
characteristic polynomials; these polynomials are then represented by the single coefficient
TrL/F (x) ∈ F . Therefore, an element x ∈ T6(Fq), which usually requires
6 log q
bits to represent, requires only
2 log q
bits to represent. More precisely, 3 elements {g, σ2(g), σ4(g)} of T6(Fq) are represented by
TrL/F (g).
To be cryptographically useful, it must be possible to compute with trace representa-
tions. To this end, [LV00, Section 2] gives optimized algorithms to compute
TrL/F (g
ab)
from the representation TrL/F (g
a) and the exponent b. This allows an XTR analogue to
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme [LV00, Section 4], which requires only 1/3 the
bandwidth of the conventional Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme in F×q6 .
Remark 3.2. Much work has been published improving the efficiency of the XTR com-
putations [SL02, SL01] and related torus-based cryptosystems [GPS04].
Now that we have seen how the XTR cryptosystem compresses elements of T6(Fq) ⊂ F×q6 ,
we can explain the extension desired by Rubin and Silverberg. They wanted to construct a
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variant of XTR that compresses elements of the degree 30 extension Fq30 over Fq. Elements
of F×q30 usually require
30 log q
bits of storage, but they hoped to achieve a representation of elements of T30(Fq) ⊂ F×q30
requiring only
ϕ(30) log q = 8 log q
bits of storage. Unfortunately, the most natural extensions of XTR do not achieve this
goal. To explain why these extensions fail to yield the desired compression, we present
Rubin and Silverberg’s geometric interpretation of the XTR cryptosystem, and show how
they use algebro-geometric tools to disprove the most natural conjectures.
First, we consider the XTR case.
3.2 The geometry of XTR
Rubin and Silverberg’s strategy is to interpret the trace map used by XTR as a birational










Figure 3.1: A geometric interpretation of the trace map, as a birational isomorphism.
In Chapter 2, we showed how Rubin and Silverberg connected T6(Fq) ⊂ F×q6 , the sub-
group used in the XTR cryptosystem, with the algebraic torus TFq6 . We now show how
they connect the set of XTR traces with an algebraic variety.
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3.2.1 The set of XTR traces
Again, let L = Fq6 extend k = Fq, and let F = Fq2 be the quadratic subfield of L. Let G =
Gal(L/k) = {e, σ, . . . , σ5}, let H = Gal(L/F ) = {e, σ2, σ4}, and let Gal(F/k) = {e, σ3}.
Remark 3.3. The unusual notation for Gal(F/k), {e, σ3} instead of {e, σ}, was chosen
because we need to work with the pairs (e, σ3), (σ, σ4), (σ2, σ5). The connection between
these pairs and Gal(F/k) is most obvious with σ3 instead of σ.
Denote by Straces the set of XTR traces, so
Straces := {TrL/F (x) : x ∈ T6(Fq) ⊂ L} ⊂ F.
Rubin and Silverberg prove that for a suitable action of the symmetric group S3 on three
symbols, there is a variety Straces and an embedding
TL/S3↪−→AF
such that Straces(k) is the image of the composition
TL(k) −→ (TL/S3)(k)↪−→AF (k),
and the set of XTR traces Straces is the image of Straces(k) under a bijection AF (k)
∼−→F .
This is Theorem 3.7, but there is some work to be done before we can prove this result.
Theorem 3.1, exploited by XTR to represent elements of T6(Fq) by traces, suggests that
the equivalence of Galois conjugates under the trace map is important. In the interpretation
of Rubin and Silverberg, this equivalence is expressed by an action of S3 on the norm-1
torus TL.
3.2.2 Equating Galois equivalence and a group action
The crucial results of this section are explicit bijections that allow us to construct a group
action that expresses the equivalence of Galois conjugates under the trace map TrL/F .
These bijections expand the presentation of [RS03, Section 7].
Let {x, σ3(x)} be a normal basis of F over k, and let {y, σ2(y), σ4(y)} be a normal basis
of Fq3 over k, so that {α, σ(α), . . . , σ5(α)}, with α = xy, is a normal basis of L over k.
(Such bases exist for all finite fields, by the Normal Basis Theorem [LN94, Theorem 2.35].)
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Observe that, in this basis, the trace map over F of an element
a = αa0 + σ(α)a1 + · · ·+ σ5(α)a5
is
TrL/F (a) = a+ σ
2(a) + σ4(a)
= (a0 + a2 + a4)(α+ σ
2(α) + σ4(α)) +
(a1 + a3 + a5)σ(α+ σ
2(α) + σ4(α))
= (a0 + a2 + a4)x(y + σ(y) + σ
2(y)) +
(a1 + a3 + a5)σ
3(x)(y + σ(y) + σ2(y))
=
(
y + σ(y) + σ2(y)
) (




To simplify matters, we want to remove the factor y + σ2(y) + σ4(y), which we denote by
λ. Since σ4(y) = σ(y), we have that σ(λ) = λ, and thus λ ∈ k. Also, λ is invertible, since
y, σ2(y), σ4(y) are linearly independent.
If we now normalize our bases by λ−1, so that our basis for F over k is {λ−1x, λ−1σ3(x)}
and our basis for L over k is {λ−1α, λ−1σ(α), . . . , λ−1σ5(α)}, then
TrL/F (λ
−1αa0 + λ
−1σ(α)a1 + · · ·+ λ−1σ5(α)a5) =
(a0 + a2 + a4)x+ (a1 + a3 + a5)σ
3(x),
(3.1)
which has a particularly simple form. We can now define bijections that capture this
simplicity.

















−1σ3(α)a3) = (a0, a3)
.
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The key point is that τ and φ give a non-standard representation of L as ((AGal(L/F ))3
)
(k),
which suggests a group action on the factors. Rubin and Silverberg define a “trace map”
t with simple form, where we have chosen the non-standard notation t to emphasize the
fact that the domain and range of t do not follow the conventions of Chapter 2.
Definition 3.5. [RS03, Theorem 13] Define the “trace map”
t : (AGal(L/F ))3 −→ AGal(L/F )
by
t((a0, a3), (a2, a5), (a4, a1)) = (a0 + a2 + a4, a1 + a3 + a5).
Examining (3.1), we have the following theorem.
















where the maps τ and φ are those of Definition 3.4.
Theorem 3.6 makes one of the symmetric maps of Theorem 2.29 explicit, and yields a
natural action of the symmetric group S3 on the product (AGal(L/F ))3 and the restriction
(GGal(F/k)m )3. Specifically, a permutation in S3 acts on (AGal(L/F ))3 by permuting the factors
AGal(L/F ). The pull-back of this action defines an action of S3 on AL = ResL/k A1 and
GL = ResL/k Gm, and it is clear that the “trace” t and the trace TrL/F are invariant under
the action and the pull-back, respectively. Thus, the equivalence of Galois conjugates under
the trace map is identified with the defined action of S3 on AL.
3.2.3 The action of the symmetric group S3 on the torus T6
Now that we have an action of S3 on AL, we must understand what this action on the
norm-1 torus T6(Fq) means in the cryptosystem XTR. To aid understanding, Figure 3.2
depicts the trace map as a birational parameterization.
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Figure 3.2: The trace map parameterizes a quotient variety.
Observe that Figure 3.2 claims that the image of TFq6 in AFq6/S3 is a subset of TFq6 ,
or in other words that the action of S3 stabilizes the norm-1 torus. We will show this
explicitly, since this case is instructive when we later consider more general actions that
stabilize tori.
Using the isomorphism TL ∼= TG, consider a point x = (x0, . . . , x5) in the torus TG,
and recall that the components of x satisfy the relations x0x3 = x1x4 = x2x5 = 1 and
x0x2x4 = x1x3x5 = 1. Every permutation in S3 is a product of transpositions, so without
loss of generality we consider only transpositions. The map τ acts as
x 7−→ ((x0, x3), (x2, x5), (x4, x1)),
and it is clear that a transposition maintains the relations of x. For example, the action
of (12) ∈ S3 is
(12)τ(x) = ((x2, x5), (x0, x3), (x4, x1)),
and the inverse map is
τ−1((12)τ(x)) = (x2, x1, x0, x5, x4, x3).
By inspection each permutation preserves the multiplicative relations, and hence the torus
TG.
Since the torus is stabilized under the action of S3, the image of TL in the quotient
GL/S3 is a well-defined variety.
However, the most significant part of Figure 3.2 is the rightmost birational embedding.
What this embedding says is that the natural trace map establishes a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the sets of Galois conjugates of elements of the norm-1 torus and their
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traces over the quadratic subfield Fq2 . Of course, this merely translates the discussion
of Section 3.1, but our geometric interpretation will show its power later. Theorem 3.7
supports Figure 3.2.
Theorem 3.7. [RS03, Theorem 13] There is a birational embedding
TL/S3↪−→AF
such that Straces(k) is the image of TL(k) in the composition
TL(k) −→ (TL/S3)(k)↪−→AF (k).
Proof. Following the proof given by Rubin and Silverberg, we have









with the top and bottom isomorphisms provided by Theorem 2.8, the left vertical map the
constructed trace provided by Theorem 2.29, and the right vertical map the “trace” t of
Definition 3.5.
The preceding discussion and the explicit construction of the top and bottom isomor-
phisms show that the morphism T rL/F : AL −→ AF factors through the quotient AL/S3,
and thus restricts to a morphism
Tr : TL/S3 −→ AF .
Since Theorem 2.36 shows that
TL ∼= TGal(L/k) ∼= G2m ∼= GF ,
we see that TL is a variety of dimension 2. Since AF is also a variety of dimension 2, to
prove that there is an embedding TL/S3↪−→AF we need only show that the restricted trace
morphism Tr is injective.
Consider an element a ∈ TL(k). Using the isomorphism τ of Definition 3.4, we may view
a = (a0, a1, a2) with each ai ∈ AGal(F/k)(k). Suppose b ∈ TL has Tr(b) = Tr(a), with Tr the
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restriction of T r defined above. By Theorem 3.1 and the appropriate lifting isomorphisms,
Tr determines all the symmetric functions of b0, b1, b2, from which follows the set equality
{a0, a1, a2} = {b0, b1, b2}. But this is precisely the statement that a is conjugate to b by an
element of S3, and that a = b in the quotient TL/S3(k).
Finally, the set Straces(k) is the image of the composition
TL(k) −→ (TL/S3)(k)↪−→AF (k)
by definition.
Translating between the many representations of the norm-1 torus, this says that the
natural trace map TrL/F : Fq6 −→ Fq2 is an explicit isomorphism identifying the norm-
1 torus T6(Fq) modulo Galois equivalence with the set of XTR traces Straces. This is


















Figure 3.3: The trace map compresses the norm-1 torus modulo Galois equivalence.
The preceding results establish Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, which graphically depict the
geometry of the XTR cryptosystem.
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3.3 Group actions on tori
Theorem 3.7 is a special case of a more general theorem that explains certain group actions
on tori. The purpose of this section is to explain the general case, and detail how XTR
fits into this larger framework.
Rubin and Silverberg define general actions on tori with the aid of some notation. As
usual, let L be a Galois extension of k with cyclic Galois group G = Gal(L/k), and let
F ⊂ L be a subfield. Denote by H the Galois group Gal(L/F ). Unlike other sections, we
assume that
n = [L : k] = |G|
is square-free. In the most cryptographically interesting cases, n is the product of the first
few primes, so our assumption is not cryptographically limiting.
Definition 3.8. [RS04a, Definition 3.1] Let ΣS denote the group of permutations rear-
ranging the set S.
Write G =
∏t
i=1Gi, with the Gi cyclic groups of distinct prime order. Since n is square-
free, there is a natural inclusion of ΣH into ΣG. The permutation group ΣG acts naturally
on AG, and the inclusion ΣH ⊂ ΣG gives an action of ΣH on AG which lifts to an action
on AL via Theorem 2.8. Since the action of ΣH merely shuffles components, ΣH preserves
GGm (equivalently, GL), but the action of ΣH does not necessarily preserve the torus TG
(equivalently, TL). Specifically, we will see that if |H| is divisible by two distinct primes,
ΣH does not preserve TL.
Remark 3.9. In the XTR case, |Gal(Fq6/Fq2)| = 3 is divisible by only one prime, and the
norm-1 torus TFq6 is preserved by ΣGal(Fq6/Fq2 ), which we identified with S3.
Observe that the permutation groups ΣGi correspond to the field extensions F ⊂ L of
prime degree, ie extensions with [L : F ] prime. The following result shows that the groups
corresponding to these extensions preserve TL.
Theorem 3.10. [RS04a, Lemma 3.5] The action of ΣGi preserves TL.
Proof. Rubin and Silverberg use the isomorphisms of Theorem 2.8 (ii) to prove that every
τ ∈ ΣGi preserves TG. We need to show that for every element x = (xσ)σ∈G ∈ TG, we have
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τ(x) = (xτσ)σ∈G ∈ TG. By Lemma 2.23 simplifying the definition of TG, it suffices to show
that Πσ∈Gjxτ(γσ) = 1 for every γ ∈ G.
Write γ = γ1 · · · γt with each γj ∈ Gj. Since τ ∈ ΣGi , τ fixes all the γj save γi and












xγγ−1i σ = 1.






Thus, the torus is preserved under the action of ΣGi .
Now that we know certain actions that preserve TL, we would like a converse theorem
that tells us exactly which actions preserve the torus. Theorem 3.12 provides this converse.
Write H =
∏
Hi, with the set of factors {Hi} a subset of the set of factors {Gi} of G.




ΣHi ⊆ ΣH .
The intuition is that the group Σ′H acts on TG by permuting components within the
individual multiplicative relations that define TG, but does not permute the components
between relations.
Theorem 3.12. [RS04a, Proposition 3.6] Let σ ∈ ΣH . If σ(TG) ⊆ TG, then σ ∈ Σ′H .
Proof. The proof of this proposition is a constructive induction that we omit to save
space.
Theorem 3.12 tells us that some permutations π ∈ ΣH are “bad”, in the sense that
they do not preserve the norm-1 torus. The following notation makes it easier to discuss
the effects of ΣH on the norm-1 torus.
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Definition 3.13. Let XF denote the image of TL in GL/ΣH .
Remark 3.14. It would be convenient to speak of the quotient TL/ΣH , but the action of
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ΣH
Figure 3.4: Some group actions do not preserve the norm-1 torus.
Remark 3.15. When ΣH does preserve the torus TL, the variety XF is the analogue of
the set Straces of XTR traces.
According to Rubin and Silverberg, the final theorem describing group actions in the
XTR cryptosystem follows from Theorem 3.12.
Theorem 3.16. [RS04a, Proposition 3.7] The induced map
TL/Σ′H −→ XF
is a birational isomorphism.
This theorem explains the role of the action of S3 on the torus TFq6 , and of the pa-
rameterization of XFq2 of Theorem 3.7 given by the trace map over Fq2 . In the XTR case,
ΣH = Σ
′
H = S3, and we have the sequence of maps
TFq6 −→ TFq6/Σ
′
H −→ XFq2 −→ AFq2 .
Referring to Figure 3.2, duplicated below, Theorem 3.16 establishes the middle arrows,
labeled “action of S3”.
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However, the most important part of Theorem 3.7 is not the birational isomorphism
TFq6/Σ
′
H −→ XFq2 ;
the most important part is that the trace map parameterizes the variety XFq2 :
T rFq6/Fq2 : XFq2
∼−→AFq2 .
We examine this more carefully in the next section.
3.4 Parameterizing quotient varieties
Rubin and Silverberg use algebraic geometry to explain why the trace map parameterizes
XFq2 . Again, let L be a Galois extension of k with cyclic Galois group G = Gal(L/k), and
suppose n = [L : k] = |G| is square-free. Let F ⊂ L be a subfield, let H = Gal(L/F ), and
write n = de with [F : k] = d.
Theorem 3.17. [RS04a, Proposition 3.2] For each index 1 6 i 6 e, the symmetric map
Si,F of Section 2.3.2 factors through GL/ΣH . Together, the symmetric maps make the
following diagram commute, where the vertical map f is an isomorphism:
GL ։ GL/ΣH →֒ AL/ΣH
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Proof. We elaborate on the proof of Rubin and Silverberg. Theorem 2.29 and the definition
of Si,F yield that Si,F is ΣH invariant, and hence factors through AL/ΣH . We must prove
that the right hand map f is an isomorphism. The form of the isomorphism ResL/F A1 −→
AH and the definition of Si,F as the Weil restriction of Si,F , yield that it suffices to prove
the theorem in the case F = k, so e = n. We appeal to a standard result of algebraic
geometry [Ful69, Chapter 2, Proposition 1]:
Proposition 3.18. Let A(X) denote the coordinate ring of the affine variety X. For affine
varieties X and Y , let ψ : X −→ Y be a polynomial map, and define the pull-back
f ∗ : A(Y ) −→ A(X)
to be
f ∗(g) = g ◦ f.
Then the map f is an isomorphism X ∼= Y if and only the map f ∗ is an isomorphism
A(X) ∼= A(Y ).
In our case, A(AL) = k[. . . , xσ, . . .], with the xσ indexed by the elements of Gal(L/k),
and thus A(AL/ΣG) = k[. . . , xσ, . . .]ΣG , the ring of ΣG-invariant polynomials. Also,
A((Ak)
n) ∼= k[. . . , xσ, . . .]. Denote the symmetric polynomials of the xσ by s1, . . . , sn. The
definition of f means f(. . . , xσ, . . .) = (s1, . . . , sn), and thus for a map g ∈ (Ak)n, the pull-
back satisfies f ∗(g) = g(s1, . . . , sn), and by abuse of notation, f
∗(A((Ak)n)) ∼= k[s1, . . . , sn].
Thus, f is an isomorphism if
k[s1, . . . , sn] ∼= k[. . . , xσ, . . .]ΣG .
The symmetric polynomials are ΣG-invariant by definition, and it follows from the Fun-
damental Theorem of Symmetric Polynomials [LN94, p. 29] that every polynomial in
k[x1, . . . , xn]
ΣG is a polynomial combination of the si. Thus the right hand map f is an
isomorphism.
Theorem 3.17 allows us to connect the symmetric functions Si,F (of which the trace
map is S1,F ) with the field of rational functions XF −→ k.
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Theorem 3.19. [RS04a, Corollary 3.4] Let φ = (φ1, . . . , φd) : AF −→ Ad be an isomor-
phism, where d is the extension degree of F over k.
Then the function field of XF , denoted k(XF ) , is generated by the following symmetric
functions:
k(XF ) = k(φj ◦ Si,F : 1 6 j 6 d, 1 6 i 6 e = n/d).
Proof. Since AL is an affine variety, the function field k(AL) is identified with the quotient
field of A(AL). From the calculation of the coordinate ring A(AL) of Theorem 3.17, the
identification
k(AL) = k(φ1 ◦ S1,F , . . . , φd ◦ Se,F )
follows. Finally, XF is a subvariety of AL, so the restriction of the maps φj ◦ Si,F to XF
generate k(XF ).
In the case of XTR, we have d = 2, and Theorem 3.1 shows that S1,Fq2 determines
S2,Fq2 (restricted to XFq2 ), so the map
f = ⊕3i=1Si,Fq2
on XFq2 can be expressed as
(T rFq6/Fq2 , p(T rFq6/Fq2 ), 1) ∈ k(XFq2 )
3,
with p a suitable polynomial, by abuse of notation. If we project only the first coordinate,
we have the result of XTR: a birational embedding
T rFq6/Fq2 = S1,Fq2 : XFq2 ↪−→AFq2 .
3.5 The LUC case
In the LUC [SL93, SS95] cryptosystem, we have k = Fq, F = Fq, and L = Fq2 . Observe
that for x ∈ T2(Fq) ⊂ Fq2 , the minimal polynomial of x is
χ(t) = (t− x)(t− xq) = t2 − (x+ xq)t+ xq+1 = t2 − TrL/F (x)t+ 1.
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Figure 3.5: The geometry of the LUC cryptosystem.
Therefore LUC can represent T2(Fq) by minimal polynomials in exactly the same way XTR
represented T6(Fq) by minimal polynomials. Figure 3.5 depicts this graphically.
Summarizing several sections, we studied group actions on tori and explained how
Rubin and Silverberg interpret the LUC and XTR cryptosystems as group actions on tori
and fortuitous birational parameterizations. After considering the structure of XF , we will
show how Rubin and Silverberg use this theory to analyze proposed extensions to the XTR
cryptosystem.
3.6 Some quotient varieties are not groups
Cryptosystems usually work in groups, such as Tn(Fq) ⊂ F×qn , but there is no reason to
believe XF
qd
will be a group, since Section 3.4 does not consider the structure of the quotient
variety XF . In the case of the XTR cryptosystem, XFq2 is not a group, and this explains
why XTR does not have a natural multiplication algorithm [LV00]. Let us explore why
this is so.
The key point is that multiplication in the norm-1 torus T6(Fq) does not preserve S3
orbits. This means that multiplying two elements in the quotient variety TFq6/S3 is not
well-defined. Let x ∈ T6(Fq) correspond to the three conjugates x, σ2(x), σ4(x) in XFq2 ,
and let y ∈ T6(Fq) correspond to the three conjugates y, σ2(y), σ4(y). For multiplication
to be well defined in XFq2 , all the possible products
xy, σ2(x)y, σ4(x)y, xσ2(y), . . . , σ4(x)σ4(y)
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must be in the same S3 orbit. However, this is generally not the case; for example, it is
not always true that the set
{xy, σ2(xy), σ4(xy)}
is the same as the set
{xσ2(y), σ2(xσ2(y)), σ4(xσ2(y))}.
This means that XFq2 is not a group, which explains the non-standard ”multiplication”
algorithm of the XTR cryptosystem.
However, exponentiation in the norm-1 torus T6(Fq) does preserve S3 orbits. Letting
x correspond to the conjugates x, σ2(x), σ4(x), it does not matter which representative we
choose to exponentiate. In other words,
{xj, σ2(xj), σ4(xj)} = {σ2(x)j, σ2(σ2(x)j), σ4(σ2(x)j)} = {σ4(x)j, σ2(σ4(x)j), σ2(σ4(x)j)}.
This fact enables the XTR cryptosystem to compute something meaningful in the quotient
XFq2 .
More generally, Rubin and Silverberg show many fields k ⊂ F ⊂ L such that XF is not
a group [RS03, Section 7].
3.7 Beyond XTR
It is natural to exploit the function field perspective of Theorems 3.17 and 3.19 to analyze
proposed extensions to XTR. Rubin and Silverberg’s strategy is to show that higher dimen-
sional analogues of XTR require parameterizing higher dimensional varieties X . Natural
extensions of XTR would parameterize X by the family of symmetric maps Si,F developed
in Section 2.3.2, which are the general analogue to the trace map. However, Rubin and
Silverberg show that the natural symmetric functions do not generate the function fields
k(X ), and so cannot parameterize these varieties X . Therefore, the symmetric maps do
not yield an analogue to Figure 3.1, and do not compress elements of Fq30 .
We concentrate on the refuted conjecture of Bosma, Hutton, and Verheul, that would
have extended XTR.









Figure 3.6: The symmetric maps are not a birational isomorphism.
Conjecture 3.20. [BHV02, Conjecture 1 (d, e)-BPV] Let n = de, with e > 1, and let q
be a prime-power.
For an element h ∈ Tn(Fq) ⊂ Fqn, let P (d)h denote the characteristic polynomial of h
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exist, for 1 6 j 6 e−u− 1, such that for every prime p and every element h ∈ Tn(Fq) that
is not contained in a proper subfield of Fpn, the coefficient aj of P (d)h is given by
aj = Q̄j(ae−1, a
p
e−1, . . . , a
pd−1
e−1 , ae−2, a
p
e−2, . . . , a
pd−1
e−2 , . . . , ae−u, a
p
e−u, . . . , a
pd−1
e−1 ),
for 1 6 j 6 e− u− 1, where Q̄j denotes Qj with coefficients reduced modulo p.
Then ud = dϕ(n)/de.
In the most cryptographically interesting case, when n = 30, the conjecture suggests
that the norm-1 torus T30(Fq) has the special property that all fifteen symmetric functions
over Fq2 are determined by the first four symmetric functions (alternatively, that all thirty
symmetric functions over Fq are determined by the first eight). This is a natural extension
of the XTR situation, where all three symmetric functions over Fq2 are determined by the
first.
For some choices of a field Fqn and a subfield Fqd , it is not difficult to fix a represen-
tation of Fqn and enumerate points in Tn(Fq) that explicitly demonstrate that Conjecture
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(d, e)-BPV is false. Rubin and Silverberg do this in the cases
(q, n, d) ∈ {(7, 30, 1), (7, 30, 2), (11, 30, 1), (11, 30, 2)}.
More interesting is their algebro-geometric result.
Theorem 3.21. [RS04a, Theorem 5.3] There is a finite set P of prime numbers such that
if char(k) /∈ P , L/k is cyclic of degree 30, k ⊂ F ⊂ L with d := [F : k] = 1 or 2, and
φ = (φ1, . . . , φd) : AF −→ Ad is an isomorphism, then the function field k(XF ) is not
generated by
{φj ◦ Si,F : 1 6 i 6 d8/de , 1 6 j 6 8}.
Proof. Rubin and Silverberg use algebraic geometry this is beyond the scope of this pre-
sentation, but we will sketch the ideas of their proof. Let us consider only the case n = 30,
d = 1, so that L = Fq30 and F = Fq, and G = H = Gal(L/k).
The proof is by contradiction in a special case, followed by a geometric lifting argument.
We first consider the contradiction.
Theorem 3.19 demonstrates that the components of all thirty maps
{φj ◦ Si,F : 1 6 i 6 30, 1 6 j 6 8}





f : ⊕30i=1Si,F : AL/ΣH −→ (Ak)30.
The fundamental observation is that if we assume that the first eight symmetric functions
S1,F , . . . ,S8,F determine the remaining symmetric functions S9,F , . . . ,S30,F , we need only
consider the “partial” map of the first eight components
s : ⊕8i=1Si,F : AL/ΣH −→ (Ak)8
instead of the complete map of thirty components. Now, since f is an isomorphism, and we
have assumed that the first eight symmetric functions determine the remaining twenty-two,
it must be that s is an isomorphism.
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However, if s is not an isomorphism, then we may conclude that the first eight symmetric
functions do not determine the remaining twenty-two. In this case, the first eight symmetric
functions do not generate k(XF ).
To achieve a contradiction, Rubin and Silverberg proved that s is not an isomorphism
over F1130 . They did this by finding points x, y ∈ TG(F1130) such that x and y were distinct
modulo the action of ΣH , but had the property that s(x) = s(y). At this point, they
were able to conclude that the symmetric functions S1,F , . . . ,S8,F did not determine the
remaining functions S9,F , . . . ,S30,F over the field F11, refuting one instance of Conjecture
3.20.
It is important to note that these computational results could have been discovered
without reference to any geometric interpretation. We could then say that some instances of
Conjecture 3.20 are false. However, the computational result can be extended significantly
with the help of some algebraic geometry.
The points x and y, and the function s, can be lifted to a field extension of Q11
of characteristic 0, yielding a neighbourhood, in the 11-adic topology, where s is not a
bijection. It follows that s is not a birational isomorphism XF −→ A8 over all fields of
characteristic 0.
Rubin and Silverberg then prove that outside a finite set of primes P , the function s
reduced modulo a prime p is not a birational isomorphism over all fields of characteris-
tic p. This lifting and reducing process relies on two deep results, Hensel’s Lemma and
Nakayama’s Lemma; see [RS04a] for the complete proof.
Theorem 3.21 establishes Figure 3.6, repeated below: the symmetric maps do not yield
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Remark 3.22. Rubin and Silverberg also claim that no eight symmetric maps determine
all of the others [RS03, Remark 5], and suggest that the symmetric maps cannot be ma-
nipulated in some fashion to parameterize the quotient varieties consider in Theorem 3.21.
By interpreting computational results in their elegant geometric framework, Rubin and
Silverberg refute the conjectures most likely to extend the XTR scheme. Their result is
a fitting end to the many pages of equivalent characterizations we have detailed in the
previous two chapters.
But, where else do we look for extensions?
Chapter 4
Rational tori and CEILIDH
The purpose of this chapter is to present the CEILIDH cryptosystem [RS03], which extends
the XTR cryptosystem. To understand the new cryptosystem, we use insight into the
birational geometry of algebraic tori developed in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, CEILIDH
does not provide a bandwidth savings greater than the ϕ(6)/6 = 1/3 of XTR. In addition,
even though the new cryptosystem does not best the XTR cryptosystem compression ratio,
it allows us to present new conjectures that, if established, will improve compression.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. First, we outline CEILIDH and
explain the birational geometry underpinning the system. Then we introduce the new
conjectures, and show how they would extend the system. Motivated by these conjectures
and known partial results, we present the birational parameterizations that Rubin and
Silverberg constructed.
For this chapter, fix a finite field Fq with q > 3 odd, and as always let σ denote the
q-Frobenius endomorphism. We choose q > 3 odd only to ensure that certain simple field
representations are possible.
4.1 Rational tori in cryptography
Figure 4.1 depicts the geometric perspective of XTR presented in Chapter 3. The key
features of this interpretation are the birational maps between the geometric objects. Jux-
taposed beneath Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 depicts the geometry of CEILIDH. The key feature
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is the rightmost birational isomorphism. a c t i o n o f
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Figure 4.2: The geometry of the CEILIDH cryptosystem.
In the XTR cryptosystem, the trace map embeds
(TFq6/S3)(Fq)↪−→AFq2 (Fq),
and the challenge was to understand the quotient variety TFq6/S3. The CEILIDH cryp-
tosystem avoids forming a quotient variety, which simplifies the system significantly. It
exploits “custom-built” inverse parameterizations





At this point we can appeal to the canon of algebraic geometry, because the existence of
a birational isomorphism between the norm-1 torus TFq6 and two dimensional affine space
A2 means that the norm-1 torus is rational.
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Definition 4.1. Let V be an affine variety. If there exists a birational isomorphism between
V and Ad for some positive integer d, we say that the variety V is rational.
It follows from Theorem 2.36 that if the norm-1 torus TFqn is rational, it must be
birationally isomorphic to Aϕ(n). This is because TFqn is isomorphic as a group to G
ϕ(n)
m ,




Since this identification is a birational parameterization, it may be undefined on varieties of
strictly smaller dimension than TFqn ; therefore some torus elements may not by compactly
represented. For cryptographically interesting tori and field sizes q, the number of such
elements is O(1/q), and therefore negligible. In fact, the constructions we present are
undefined only at a small constant number of torus elements, and we therefore do not even
consider undefined points in the protocols presented later.
At this point, it should be clear that the rationality of the torus TFqn is closely connected
to the existence of cryptosystems providing large compression ratios. Luckily, we can
connect the question of the rationality of the norm-1 torus to existing work.
Conjecture 4.2. (Voskresenskii, [Vos98]) If L is a cyclic extension of a field k, then the
norm-1 torus TL is rational.
As stated, Conjecture 4.2 is more general than we need. Because Fqn is always a cyclic
extension of Fq, the conjecture states that TFqn is rational for every n. If we believe the
conjecture, we should be able to achieve a cryptosystem with compression ratio n/ϕ(n)
for every integer n — which is remarkable, because n/ϕ(n) can be made arbitrarily large.
However,
n/ϕ(n) < ln lnn
for all n > 6, so the degree of the field extension quickly becomes too large for practical
use. Additionally, in practice protocols operate in a subgroup of the torus Tn, and in this
subgroup, classical attacks will be hopelessly impractical, allowing a much smaller torus to
be used. It follows that arbitrarily efficient cryptographic protocols could be realized — if
the rational isomorphisms of Definition 4.1 were made explicit and implemented efficiently,
but there is not always practical value in doing so.
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Unfortunately, Voskresenskii’s Conjecture appears unassailable. However, it certainly
is a natural conjecture that, if established, promises to significantly improve the XTR
cryptosystem. In this sense, Conjecture 4.2 replaces Conjecture 3.20.
Let n = |Gal(L/k)| be the degree of the extension field. Two results suggest that it is
possible to construct explicit birational isomorphisms between TFqn and Aϕ(n) for certain
integers n. Voskresenskii [Vos98, Chapter 2] shows that TL is rational when n is a prime
power. More important to us, Klyachko [Kly88] shows TL is rational when n is a product of
two prime powers. Voskresenskii [Vos99] claimed to have a proof for general n in the case
where k is of characteristic zero, but according to Rubin and Silverberg [RS03, Section 4],
there is a flaw in his argument.
4.2 The construction of CEILIDH
Motivated by Klyachko’s result that TFq6 is rational, this section presents the explicit
parameterization of T6(Fq) given by Rubin and Silverberg [RS03, Section 5]. Recall that
T6(Fq) =
{
x ∈ F×q6 : NFq6/Fq2 (x) = 1 andNFq6/Fq3 (x) = 1
}
.




ψ : A2(Fq) −→ T6(Fq)
are inverse birational isomorphisms when lifted to T6 and A2. Our presentation follows
Rubin and Silverberg’s original presentation, adding small details and diagrams where
helpful.
4.2.1 Norm-1 elements
Since Fq6 is a quadratic extension of Fq3 , it is easy to represent the elements with norm
1. Let Fq6 = Fq3(x) for a suitable element x, and suppose the non-trivial element of
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In fact, almost all elements with norm 1 are of this form.
Theorem 4.3. (Hilbert’s Theorem 90) Let L be a finite Galois extension of k, and let
G = Gal(L/k) by cyclic with generator σ. Then an element β ∈ L has norm 1 if and only
if β = γ/σ(γ) for some element γ ∈ L.
It follows from Theorem 4.3 that only the identity element 1 is not of the special form
(β + x)/(β + σ3(x)).
Let {α1, α2, α3} be a basis for Fq3 over Fq; recalling that Fq6 = Fq3(x), we have that
{α1, α2, α3, xα1, xα2, xα3} is a basis for Fq6 over Fq. Define an injective map
ξ : A3(Fq)↪−→F×q6
by





γ = α1u1 + α2u2 + α3u3.




(u1, u2, u3) : NFq6/Fq2 (ξ(u1, u2, u3)) = 1
}
,
then by Theorem 4.3, the restriction of ξ to U gives a bijection
ξ : U
∼−→T6(Fq)− {1}.
Moreover, since σ is a polynomial function, ξ is a morphism.
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A
3(Fq) NFq6/Fq2 = 1
ξ
T6(Fq)
Figure 4.3: The map ξ on all A3(Fq).
U
A
3(Fq) NFq6/Fq2 = 1
ξ
T6(Fq)
Figure 4.4: The map ξ restricted to U .
4.2.2 The variety U
Rubin and Silverberg claim that U is a hypersurface in A3(Fq) defined by a single quadratic
equation in u1, u2, u3, and we will demonstrate this. It suffices to establish the claim for a
single basis of Fq6 over Fq, so let {α, σ2(α), σ4(α)} be a normal basis of Fq3 over Fq, and
let Fq2 = Fq(x) with x2 = R and R a non-square in Fq. (Note that a non-square R always
exists, since q is odd.) The pairwise products {α, σ2(α), σ4(α), xα, xσ2(α), xσ4(α)} form a
basis of Fq6 over Fq.
An element u = (u1, u2, u3) of U satisfies NFq6/Fq2 (ξ(u)) = 1, so that denoting





















(γ + x)σ2(γ + x)σ4(γ + x) = (γ − x)σ2(γ − x)σ4(γ − x),
and since σ2 fixes x, this expression simplifies to
2x
(
σ(γ)σ2(γ) + σ(γ)σ4(γ) + σ2(γ)σ4(γ)−R
)
= 0.
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Since σ also fixes u1, u2, u3, we see that each term σ(γ), σ
2(γ), σ4(γ) is linear in the variables
u1, u2, u3. It follows that U is the zero locus of a quadratic in u1, u2, u3, as claimed.
4.2.3 Parameterizing U







Figure 4.5: Parameterizing U .
We use the construction called “stereographic projection from a point”. As an example
of projection from a point, Figure 4.6 illustrates the familiar identification of the sphere
with the plane. (Note that the north pole itself is not identified with a point of the plane.)
Distinguish a point a = (a1, a2, a3) on the surface U . We are going to identify the
surface U with the plane by projecting from the point a, which is the equivalent of the
north pole in Figure 4.6.
We can assume that the plane tangent to U at the point a is given by the single equation
u1 = α1, since we are free to modify our basis {α1, α2, α3}.
For each pair of parameters (v1, v2) ∈ A2(Fq), consider the line
L : a+ t(1, v1, v2).
We appeal to Bezout’s Theorem [Har95, Theorem 18.3] to show that L intersects U at
precisely two points. (The line L can be seen in Figure 4.8.)
Remark 4.4. Bezout’s Theorem applies only to projective varieties, but it is possible to
define projective varieties L and U corresponding to L and U , verify that these projective
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Figure 4.6: Stereographic projection from the north pole identifies the sphere and the
plane.
varieties satisfy the conditions of Bezout’s Theorem, consider intersections “at infinity”,
and conclude that L intersects U at two points. We appeal to the reader’s understanding
of algebraic geometry at this point, because a complete demonstration would take us far
afield.
One of the points of intersection is the trivial intersection t = 0 at the point a; the





where f(v1, v2) ∈ Fq[v1, v2] is an explicit polynomial that can be easily computed. (The
polynomial f depends on the point a and the choice of basis for Fq6 over Fq. We detail the
calculation of f , for some finite fields of special form, in Examples 4.7 and 4.8.)




Figure 4.7: The plane tangent to U at a.
Remark 4.5. The set V (f) of points (v1, v2) where f(v1, v2) = 0 corresponds to the
“intersections at infinity” in Bezout’s Theorem.
Define a bijection
g : A2(Fq)− V (f)
∼−→U − {a},
where g maps a pair (v1, v2) to the non-trivial point of intersection defined above:




Figure 4.8 shows the map g.
The map g is clearly an injection, since no two distinct lines intersect at more than one
point. It follows that the composition ξ ◦ g defines a bijection
ψ : A2(Fq)− V (f)
∼−→T6(Fq)− {1, ξ(a)}.
62 Chapter 4. Rational tori and CEILIDH
u1 = a1




a + (1, v1, v2)
U
Figure 4.8: The map g is the projection, from the point a, of (v1, v2) onto the surface U .
Rubin and Silverberg also compute the inverse of ψ. Given an element β ∈ T6(Fq) −
{1, ξ(a)}, express β as
β = β1 + β2x,
with β1 and β2 in Fq3 . Observe that β2 6= 0, since if β2 = 0 we would have





so β1 = ±1. However,
NFq6/Fq2 (−1) = (−1)
q4+q2+1 = (−1)(−1)(−1) = −1 6= 1,
so we must have β1 = 1. However, we assumed β 6= 1, so we may conclude that β2 6= 0.
Write
(1 + β1)/β2 = u1α1 + u2α2 + u3α3,
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with each ui in Fq. Then it is straightforward to verify that









is an inverse to ψ.
4.2.4 The complete parameterization
Observe that in the preceding discussion, at no time did we actually that an input x was
an element of F×q6 . It follows that our bijections ρ and ψ are really more than bijections;
they are defined over F̄q.
Theorem 4.6. [RS03, Theorem 10] The maps ρ and ψ lift to inverse birational isomor-
phisms between the norm-1 torus TFq6 and the affine plane A
2.
We have a birational parameterization of the norm-1 torus T6!
4.3 Explicit rational maps
To gain familiarity with the choices involved in Rubin and Silverberg’s construction, let us
work some examples. The first was given by Rubin and Silverberg.
Example 4.7. [RS03, Example 11] Fix a prime power q ≡ 2(mod 9), and observe that a
primitive ninth root of unity ζ9 exists in Fq6 . Thus a primitive third root of unity ζ3 = ζ39
exists in Fq; let
x = ζ3
and let
y = ζ9 + ζ
−1
9 .
We have that Fq2 = Fq(x), since x2 +x+1 = 0, and that Fq3 = Fq(y), since y3−3y+1 = 0
and y satisfies no non-zero polynomial of degree less than 3. Choosing the basis {1, y, y2−2}
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for Fq3 over Fq, and computing the Galois conjugates for these basis elements in terms of
y, we find the following relations:
yq
4
= y2 − 2
(y2 − 2)q4 = −(y2 − 2)− y
yq
2
= −(y2 − 2)− y
(y2 − 2)q2 = y.
For all triples (u1, u2, u3), the image ξ(u1, u2, u3) satisfies the norm condition over the cubic
subfield Fq3 , so we need only find the quadratic equation that defines
U = {(u1, u2, u3) ∈ A3(Fq) : NFq6/Fq2 (ξ(u1, u2, u3)) = 1}.
Recall that ξ(u1, u2, u3) =
γ+x
γ+σ3(x)
with γ = u1 + yu2 + (y













Since q ≡ 2(mod 3), we find σ3(x) ≡ xq3 ≡ xq ≡ x2(mod q), so that U is the zero locus (in









+ x2)(γ + x2).











)− (γ + γq2 + γq4)
]
= 0. (4.1)












= u1 + (y












= u1 − ((y2 − 2) + y)u2 + yu3.
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These relations allow us to simplify (4.1) above to
3(x− x2)(u21 − u22 − u23 − u1 + u2u3) = 0,
and since 3 6= 0, by our assumption on q, and x− x2 6= 0, we have
U = V (u21 − u22 − u23 − u1 + u2u3),
the zero locus of the quadratic u(u1, u2, u3) = u
2
1−u22−u23−u1 +u2u3 in the three variables
u1, u2, u3.
Distinguish the point
a = (0, 0, 0).



















and we have that the tangent plane to U at the point a is u1 = a1 = 0, as desired.
For each point (v1, v2) of A2(Fq) we need to compute the intersection of U and the line





u(t, tv1, tv2) = t
2 − (tv1)2 − (tv2)2 − t+ (tv1)(tv2) = 0.
Ignoring the trivial solution, t = 0, that corresponds to the intersection at the point a, we
compute that
t = 1/(1− v21 − v22 − v1v2),
and that the polynomial f(v1, v2) is
f(v1, v2) = 1− v21 − v22 − v1v2.
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Thus, the map g is given by
g(v1, v2) = (1, v1, v2)/(1− v21 − v22 − v1v2)
and therefore we have the bijection
ψ : A2(Fq)− V (f)
∼−→T6(Fq)− {1, ξ(a)}















3 . For an element β = β1 + β2x of T6(Fq) − {1, ζ23},
write
(1 + β1)/β2 = u1 + yu2 + (y
2 − 2)u3.
Then the inverse map ρ is
ρ(β) = (u2/u1, u3/u1).
Figure 4.9 diagrams the complete example.
Summarizing the example, we chose a basis of Fq6 over Fq and a point a such that the
tangent plane to the variety U at a had special form. We then used the geometric technique
of stereographic projection to associate each point of a plane with a distinct point of the
variety U . Finally, we identified the variety U and the norm-1 torus T6(Fq), resulting in
inverse birational isomorphisms between T6 and A2.
We have successfully presented a rational parameterization of the torus T6(Fq) over a
large family of fields Fq. (In fact, this example applies also to prime powers q ≡ 5(mod 9)
with minor transpositions throughout.)
The following example is original.
Example 4.8. Let q be a prime power such that q ≡ 1(mod 3), so that there exists a
non-cube R modulo q, and such that q ≡ 3(mod 4), so that −1 is not a square modulo q.
(Recall that R is a non-cube exactly when R(q−1)/3 6≡ 1(mod q), so it is easy to recognize
a suitable R.) Let y3 = R; then Fq3 = Fq(y), and {R, y + y2, y2 − y} is a basis of Fq3 over
Fq. Also, we have that R(q−1)/3 is a primitive cube root of unity; write q = 3k + 1 and let













Figure 4.9: The geometry of Example 4.7.
ω = Rk, so that ω2 + ω + 1 = 0. Finally, let x2 = S, with S a non-square; then we have















If we let γ = Ru1 + (y + y
2)u2 + (y





+ x) = (γ − x)(γq2 − x)(γq4 − x).
This locus is the zero set of a quadratic u, with
u(u1, u2, u3) = S + 3R(Ru
2
1 − u22 + u23) = 0.
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In the previous example, we considered the case when the tangent plane to U at a point
a was expressed as the plane u1 = a1; now we vary from this template slightly. Instead
of the plane u1 = a1, we distinguish a point a such that the tangent plane to U at a is
u3 = a3. (Alternatively, we could reorder our basis elements.) For a point a = (a1, a2, a3)
on the surface U , to be determined shortly, we consider two cases.
First, if a1 = a2 = 0, then the remaining coordinate a3 must be a solution to the
equation S + 3Ru23 = 0.
Second, if a1 = a3 = 0, then the remaining coordinate a2 must be a solution to the
equation S − 3Ru22 = 0.
Since −1 is not a square modulo q, one of the preceding equations has a solution;




Then the tangent plane to U at the point
a = (0, 0,
√
−S/(3R))
satisfies u3 = a3.
For each pair (v1, v2) ∈ Fq × Fq, we consider the intersections of U and the line a +
t(v1, v2, 1). Substituting, we have
S + 3R(R(tv1)
2 − (tv2)2 + (a3 + t)2) = 0
Rt2v21 − t2v22 + a23 + 2a3t+ t2 = −S/(3R)
Rt2v21 − t2v22 + 2a3t+ t2 = 0,
so that the non-trivial intersection has parameter






/(Rv21 − v22 + 1),
which results in the polynomial






(Rv21 − v22 + 1).
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Finally, we can write down equations defining the maps ψ and ρ.






Figure 4.10 diagrams the parts of the preceding construction.
L
U
g(v1, v2) = (v1, v2, 1)/f(v1, v2)
(















Figure 4.10: The geometry of Example 4.8.
For the inverse map, express an element of T6(Fq)−{1, ξ(a)} in the form β = β1 + β2x
and write (1 + β1)/β2 = Ru1 + (y + y
2)u2 + (y
2 − y)u3. Then
ρ : T6(Fq)− {1, ξ(a3)}
∼−→A2(Fq)− V (f)









and we have another effectively computable rational parameterization of the torus T6,
albeit over a significantly smaller family of fields Fq.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we connected compact representations of norm-1 tori to an existing con-
jecture from the literature of algebraic geometry. We explored some of the ramifications of
Conjecture 4.2 on the existence of rational norm-1 tori, and considered the state of knowl-
edge surrounding it. Informed by the result that the torus T6 is rational, we presented
Rubin and Silverberg’s general procedure for constructing birational isomorphisms
T6(Fq) −→ F2q,
and gave details of the procedure in two cases.
Moreover, we explained that the cryptosystem CEILIDH does not achieve a better
compression ratio than the XTR cryptosystem achieves, and that the rationality of the
variety TFq30 is the problem preventing the CEILIDH system from improving. In the
next chapter, we present a generalized notion of rational varieties and explain how this




In this chapter, we present a generalization of the notion of rational variety, and show
that this generalization can be used to achieve compression ratios better than the 1/3
achieved by the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems. We present work published in two
research papers. The first paper, due to van Dijk and Woodruff, suggested generalizing
rationality to stable rationality, and presented an inefficient scheme that exploited that
generalization [vDW04]. The second paper, due to seven authors including van Dijk and
Woodruff, extended the previous scheme and streamlined the implementation, making it
computationally feasible [vDGP+05]. Indeed, they implemented the scheme and showed
that it performed similarly to existing schemes. Unfortunately, neither scheme achieves a
savings when compressing a single torus element; they only achieve a savings when multiple
torus elements are compressed. We will explain why this is the case in Section 5.1, before
we consider the details of the construction.
First, let us outline the strategy of the schemes. To achieve an asymptotically higher
compression ratio, van Dijk and Woodruff extend the rational maps technique of Rubin
and Silverberg to higher dimensional tori, including the next largest cryptographically in-
teresting tori T30 and T210. Since it is not known if the torus T30 is rational, an explicit
parameterization is not their goal; instead, van Dijk and Woodruff generalize the notion
of rational variety, and show that their generalization yields a decomposition of tori that
parameterizes T30(Fq) as a factor of a larger product. They then show that such a decom-
position yields a high compression ratio when many torus elements are compressed.
71
72 Chapter 5. Stably rational tori
The precise property van Dijk and Woodruff use is stable rationality.
Definition 5.1. Let V be an affine variety. If there exist non-negative integers D and E
such there is a birational isomorphism between V ×AD and AE, we say that the variety V
is stably rational.
Observe that a rational variety is trivially stably rational, with D = 0 and E the
dimension of V .
The crucial point is that the norm-1 torus TFqn may be stably rational even though




for appropriate integers f and g, even when n is not the product of two prime powers. It
is this stably rational property that van Dijk and Woodruff exploit to achieve compressed
representations of T30(Fq) and T210(Fq).
Remark 5.2. In fact, an identity of the form (5.1) always exists: Voskresenskii [Vos98,
Section 5.1] has shown that for every field L with cyclic Galois group, the norm-1 torus TL
is stably rational.
This chapter develops the chronologically later results of van Dijk et al. [vDGP+05],
but follows the presentation and proofs of the earlier exposition of van Dijk and Woodruff
[vDW04].
















where µ denotes the Möbius inversion function [LN94, Definition 3.22].
However, this decomposition is not an isomorphism of mathematical structures; instead,
it is only a computable bijection between simple structures. In fact, the results of van Dijk
and Woodruff follow from group order considerations alone. In contrast to the CEILIDH
parameterizations, which were entirely geometric, there is no strong geometric intuition
underlying the construction.
Before we construct the bijection θ1, let us show that such a map is valuable to cryp-
tographers.
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Figure 5.1: The case n = 30 of the bijection θ1 of van Dijk and Woodruff.
5.1 Asymptotically optimal compression
































can be efficiently computed.
Our goal is to compress a sequence of M torus elements
{ai}Mi=1 ⊂ Tn(Fq)∗.



















The crucial observation is that the order of Fσ
+(n)
q is greater than the order of Fσ
−(n)
q . One

















Thus, we have a bijection
Fσ+(n)q ∼= Fσ
−(n)
q × Fϕ(n)q ,
and therefore we may consider the equivalent map






Using this map θ1, we can compress the sequence of torus elements {ai}Mi=1 with the fol-
lowing procedure.
First, compute
(c1, z1) = θ1(a1, z0) ∈ Fϕ(n)q × Fσ
−(n)
q ,
where z0 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Fσ
−(n)
q . Now, compute
(c2, z2) = θ1(a2, z1),
and in general
(ci+1, zi+1) = θ1(ai+1, zi).
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, we must be able to recover the sequence {ai}Mi=1.
This is done by computing
θ−11 (cM , zM) = (aM , zM−1),
followed by
θ−11 (cM−1, zM−1) = (aM−1, zM−2),
and in general
θ−11 (ci−1, zi−1) = (ai−1, zi−2).





Now, we need to establish the claim that the sequence {ci}Mi=1 in fact requires fewer
bits than the sequence {ai}Mi=1. By assumption, each element ai ∈ F×qn requires n log q bits
of storage, and each element ci ∈ Fϕ(n)q requires ϕ(n) log q bits of storage. It follows that
the sequence {ai}Mi=1 requires
Mn log q





Mϕ(n) log q + |Fσ−(n)q | log q





This is asymptotically optimal compression, since the norm-1 torus Tn is of dimension
ϕ(n), and hence Tn(Fq) requires at least ϕ(n) log q bits to represent.
We now turn to realizing efficiently computable maps θ1.
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5.2 Preliminaries




x ∈ F×qn : NFqn/Fqd (x) = 1 for each subfield Fqd ( Fqn
}
,
and that these points are precisely the Fq-rational points of TFqn (see Section 2.3.2). In
this section, we will need to work with the Fqd-rational points of TFqn , so we recall that for
Fq ⊆ Fq` ⊆ F̄q, we defined
Tn(Fq`) =
{
x ∈ Fq`n : NFqn/Fqd (x) = 1 for each subfield Fqd ( Fqn
}
.
This captures the dependence of what we call the norm-1 torus on the field of definition.


















Observe that the original result (5.2) of van Dijk and Woodruff is the case of (5.3) with
m = 1, since T1(Fqd) = F×qd .
We stress that the maps θm are bijections only. They are not group isomorphisms that
preserve multiplicative structure, and they are not geometric isomorphisms defined for all
points over the algebraic closure of our base field. In fact, in this chapter we are only
interested in computational results, so we restrict ourselves to a finite field Fq throughout.
In addition, the symbol ‘∼=’ is to be read as “group isomorphism” for the remainder of this
chapter (before, we used ‘∼=’ to denote an isomorphism of varieties). Finally, recall that
we denote the cyclic group of order N by CN .
We need an effective version of the Fundamental Theorem of Abelian Groups [J99,
Theorem 2.4.12].
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Figure 5.2: The case n = 30, m = 6 of the bijection (5.3), θ6 : T30(Fq)×T6(Fq)
∼−→T6(Fq5).
Proposition 5.3. Suppose n = r1r2 · · · rk, with the ri pairwise relatively prime positive









Proof. For a proof emphasizing the computational complexity of the bijections, see [vDW04,
Lemma 1].
5.3 Motivating identities
In this section, we concentrate on one factor Tm(Fqd) in the domain of θm. Following van
Dijk and Woodruff, we will demonstrate a bijection between the factor Tm(Fqd) and a
product of tori.
Let us consider some suggestive isomorphisms. We need the following standard result
on cyclotomic polynomials [LN94, Theorem 2.45].
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Proposition 5.4. If p is a prime, and a is a positive integer not divisible by p, then
Φap(x)Φa(x) = Φa(x
p).
This identity suggests the following result.
Theorem 5.5. [vDGP+05, Theorem 2] If p is a prime, q is a prime power, a is a positive
integer, a is not divisible by p, and gcd(Φap(q),Φa(q)) = 1, then
Tap(Fq)× Ta(Fq) ∼= Ta(Fqp).
(Recall that ‘∼=’ denotes “group isomorphism”.)
Proof. Recall that Tn(Fq) is isomorphic to a subgroup of F∗qn of order Φn(q). Since F∗qn is
cyclic for every n, each of the factors on the left is cyclic. Since the factors on the left
have relatively prime orders, the left hand side is isomorphic to a cyclic group of order
Φap(q) ·Φa(q), by Proposition 5.3. The right hand side is isomorphic to a subgroup of F∗qap ,
and hence is cyclic of order Φa(x
p). By Proposition 5.4, the left factors and the right side
have the same order, and thus Proposition 5.3 yields an isomorphism.
Proposition 5.4 extends naturally.






Proof. We prove the result by induction on the number of prime divisors of d. If d = p is
itself prime, then the result is just Proposition 5.4. Now suppose the result is true for any
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We would like to extend Theorem 5.5 to prove Tm(Fqd) ∼=
∏
e|d Tme(Fq), but we can
not do so: in general these objects are not isomorphic. The immediate obstacle is that we
cannot guarantee gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q)) = 1 for each pair of divisors e|d, f |d, with e 6= f .
The presence of repeated divisors in the orders of the groups Tme(Fq) prevents the natural
isomorphism. Therefore, our first task is to explain how to isolate the repeated divisors.
5.4 Isolating the repeated divisors
The technical tools to handle the repeated divisors in the product
∏
e|d Φme(x) are provided
by van Dijk and Woodruff [vDW04, Section 3].
First, let us clarify the meaning of repeated divisors.
Definition 5.7. For each d| n
m
, let Wd be the smallest positive integer such that
gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q),Φm(q
d)/Wd) = 1
for every pair of divisors e|d, f |d, with d 6= e.
Wd is the repeated divisor preventing natural isomorphisms. Therefore, the offending
subsets of Tme(Fq) must be isolated and handled separately.
Lemma 5.8. Let d| n
m
, and let Wd be defined as above. Then
gcd(Wd,Φm(q
d)/Wd) = 1.
Proof. We follow the proof of [vDW04, Lemma 2]. Suppose a prime p divides Wd. By the
definition of Wd, there must be e|d, f |d, with e 6= f , such that p| gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q)). Now,
if p|Φm(qd)/Wd we would have p| gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q),Φm(qd)/Wd) = 1, a contradiction.
Therefore gcd(Wd,Φm(q
d)/Wd) = 1.
This result allows van Dijk and Woodruff to split each torus Tm(Fqd) into two pieces,
one of size Φm(q
d)/Wd, and the other of size Wd. The first piece can be handled with the
help of Theorem 5.3. We hope that Wd, the size of the piece that cannot be easily handled,
is “small” for each d, so that the forthcoming Lemma 5.10 result takes care of most of
Tm(Fqd).
First, some notation.
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Definition 5.9. Fix an integer d| n
m




The values ye are the sizes of the groups in the domain of θm after we have removed
the repeated divisors.
Lemma 5.10. For d| n
m
, let Wd be defined as above, and for e|d, let ye be defined as above.
Then




Proof. We follow the proof of [vDW04, Lemma 2]. We must show three things: first, that
the group orders on the left and on the right are the same; second, that gcd(Wd, ye) = 1
for each e|d, and third, that gcd(ye, yf ) = 1 for each e|d, f |d, with e 6= f .





d)/Wd). Now, suppose a prime
p| gcd(Φme(q),Φm(qd)/Wd) for some e|d. Then p does not divide Φmf (q) for f |d with e 6= f ,
since otherwise we would have p| gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q),Φm(qd)/Wd) = 1, a contradiction.

















Second, we have that
gcd(Wd, ye) = gcd(Wd, gcd(Φme(q),Φm(q
d)/Wd)) = gcd(Wd,Φme(q),Φm(q
d)/Wd),
and the final term certainly divides gcd(Wd,Φm(q
d)/Wd) = 1, so gcd(Wd, ye) = 1.
Finally, for e 6= f ,
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which is 1 by the definition of Wd. Thus, Proposition 5.3 applies and




5.5 Bijections for the repeated factors
We would like to decompose the factor CWd further. Unfortunately, we do not have an
interpretation of CWd in terms of algebraic tori, or even an interpretation as a product of
cyclic groups: CWd may not be isomorphic to a conceptually simple structure. The best
we can do is present an effectively computable bijection between sets of equal sizes. The
following bijection of van Dijk and Woodruff does this by providing a table lookup, that
is efficient provided Wd is small.
Definition 5.11. Fix a divisor d| n
m
, and let Wd be defined as above. For each divisor e|d,
let
ze = gcd(Φme(q),Wd).
The values ze are the sizes of the repeated divisors in the orders of the groups in the
domain of θm.
Lemma 5.12. [vDW04, Lemma 3] There exist bijections between CWd and
∏
e|dCze, re-
quiring O(logWd +log n+log log q) time to evaluate, and O(Wdn
1+ε log q) storage, for any
constant ε > 0.
Proof. Observe that if a prime p divides gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q)), then p - Φm(qd)/Wd: if
p|Φm(qd)/Wd, then p| gcd(Φme(q),Φmf (q),Φm(qd)/Wd) = 1, which is a contradiction. This
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This means there exists a bijection between the two groups, viewed as sets (recall that we
do not preserve group structure).
Now choose a generator g of CWd , and generators Ce of Cze . Make a table that maps
gi to a unique tuple (Ciee )e|d for each index 0 6 i 6 Wd. If we implement the table so
that lookups are efficient in both directions, then we can evaluate either bijection using
standard algorithms in time O(logWd + log n+ log log q) (for example, as an indexed hash
table). Additionally, since the sum of divisors of n is bounded by O(n1+ε) for any constant
ε > 0, the table requires space bounded by O(Wdn
1+ε log q).
In practice we can choose Wd to be insignificant in comparison to the other parameters
of the cryptographic scheme, so that the computation and storage required to evaluate the
bijection above is not a performance bottleneck. However, the best proved result is due to
van Dijk and Woodruff: they show that for certain fields, Wd grows sub-linearly with the
degree n of the torus Tn [vDW04, Section 4.3].
Remark 5.13. In the following theorems, we assume that Wd is “small” for each d| nm , so
that the maps of Lemma 5.12 are efficiently computable.
Corollary 5.14. Fix a divisor d| n
m
. Assuming that the table-based maps of Lemma 5.12










Now that we have shown how van Dijk and Woodruff decompose the torus Tm(Fqd) into
a product of cyclic groups, we need to show how to glue those groups back together into a
product of tori.
Lemma 5.15. [vDW04, Lemma 4] Fix a divisor d| n
m
, and let ye and ze be as defined
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Proof. It suffices to show that for each e|d, we have Cye ×Cze ∼= Tme(Fq). First, the group
orders match:
yeze = gcd(Φme(q),Φm(q
d)/Wd) · gcd(Φme(q),Wd) = Φme(q),
since gcd(Φm(q
d)/Wd,Wd) = 1, by Proposition 5.8. Second, we have




which certainly divides gcd(Φm(q
d)/Wd,Wd) = 1. Now, since the left product Cye × Cze
and the right torus Tme(Fq) are isomorphic to cyclic groups of the same order, Proposition
5.3 gives an efficient isomorphism between them.
The following bijection, implicit in the statement of [vDGP+05, Theorem 4], completes
our presentation of van Dijk and Woodruff’s treatment of the extra factors in the bijections
θm.











5.6 Bijections for high dimensional tori
Finally, we are ready to show how van Dijk and Woodruff exploit the preceding lemmas to
demonstrate the complete bijection θm. First, we prove the result relating group orders.
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by induction on the number of prime divisors of m.












) = Φn(x) as desired.
Let the induction hypothesis be that the statement is true for m dividing n with m
having at least 2 ≤ k ≤ r prime divisors and consider, for an appropriate prime p dividing
m, the statement for m
p
, which has strictly fewer prime divisors than m. Then
∏













































































by an application of Proposition 5.4 (which applies, since m|n is square-free) and the
induction hypothesis.
Theorem 5.18. [vDGP+05, Theorem 4] Let m be a divisor of n. Assuming the table-based
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so we can view the bijection as a map between products of tori. The theorem will follow if
we show that the tori on the left are the same as the tori on the right, and this is equivalent



















































This identity holds in the polynomial ring Q[x], which is a unique factorization domain;
thus, the polynomials on the left must be the same as the polynomials on the right. Since
the cyclotomic polynomials are irreducible over Q [LN94, Theorem 2.45], this factorization
establishes the desired multiset equality, and the theorem follows.
5.7 Bounding the repeated divisors
In the preceding sections, we showed how van Dijk and Woodruff isolate and handle the
repeated divisors preventing natural isomorphisms between Tm(Fqd) and
∏
e|d Tme(Fqd), but
we have not yet considered the computational impact of these divisors. The definition of
Wd shows that we need not consider each divisor d| nm separately: it suffices to analyze only
n, since Wd|W n
m
|Wn. Therefore, it suffices to consider only m = 1, or the original bijection
(5.2) of van Dijk and Woodruff.
However, there is another issue: in the bijection θ1, we need table storage for every




infinitely often for every ε > 0 [HW79, Theorem 317], the number of tables could be more
computationally significant than an upper bound for Wd. In practice, however, n is fixed
(and, in fact, has few divisors), so the storage required to implement the bijection θ1 is not
significant.
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The asymptotic growth of Wn has been analyzed by van Dijk and Woodruff [vDW04,






Their analysis is restricted to fields Fq with field order q satisfying rather onerous congru-
ence conditions, and is somewhat artificial because they consider Wn as a function of n,
and bound Wn as n tends to infinity. This conflicts with common practice, which fixes n
and lets the field order Fq tend to infinity. These limitations of the analysis are not an
issue in practice, because we can efficiently choose parameters so that any repeated factors
are negligible. In summary, van Dijk and Woodruff’s sub-linear bound on the repeated
factors Wn is a theoretical result supporting the validity of the method, but it does not
address the instances used in practice.
Let us outline van Dijk and Woodruff’s result. To make their strong statement about
the growth of Wn, the authors need to make strong assumptions about the field order q,
which plays a prominent role in Definition 5.7 specifying Wn. To make these assumptions,
they give a probabilistic Las Vegas algorithm, algorithm PSA [vDW04, Section 4.3], that,
if it terminates, finds a field Fq with field order q satisfying the congruences needed for the






Finally, van Dijk and Woodruff show that algorithm PSA terminates with high probability.
The analysis depends heavily on the asymptotic density of primes p such that p − 1 is
square-free, which is far from our field.
Unfortunately, van Dijk and Woodruff state that the algorithm does not find the cryp-
tographically best parameters for the n = 30 case until the field order q is of approximately
500 bits, and therefore the analysis is irrelevant in practice, since it is not applicable to
fields of cryptographic size (which have 30q ≈ 1024 or q ≈ 35). However, the theoretical
result is important because it suggests that the technique is practicable in some cases.
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5.8 Exploiting the bijections of CEILIDH
The original bijection θ1 of van Dijk and Woodruff [vDW04] is as in Theorem 5.18 with
divisor m = 1. However, observe that T1(Fqd) = F×qd is rational; this motivates the following
recursive procedure. If m is chosen so that Tm is rational, then each extra factor Tm(Fqd)
in the range of θm can itself be compactly represented, yielding even greater savings. In
practice, choosing m the product of two distinct primes is best, because these are tori Tm
we know to be rational. We will only consider the case m = 6, for which we have the
CEILIDH maps of Chapter 4.
When m = 6 and n = 30, van Dijk et al. point out that the situation is even more
fortuitous. They show that gcd(Φ30(q),Φ5(q)) = 1, independent of q (this follows from
[vDW04, Lemma 6]). Thus Theorem 5.5 establishes the isomorphism
T30(Fq)× T6(Fq) ∼= T6(Fq5),




For n = 210, we have the slightly weaker effectively computable bijections
T210(Fq)× T6(Fq5)× T6(Fq7)
∼−→T6(Fq35),
yielding a birational parameterization
T210(Fq)× A24(Fq)
∼−→A72(Fq).









then we have a parameterization
Tn × AD(m,n)
∼−→Aϕ(n)+D(m,n).
In fact, van Dijk et al. even improve this result. First, we relate the group orders:
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Figure 5.3: Exploiting the CEILIDH parameterizations for even greater compression.








where for index i = k − 1 the empty product xpk+1···pk is interpreted as x.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of prime divisors of n. The statement
is vacuously true for k = 2. Suppose the statement is true for all n with at most k > 2
divisors p1, . . . , pk, and consider a prime pk+1 distinct from each pi. By Theorem 5.4,
Φnpk+1(x)Φn(x) = Φn(x



















which establishes the identity.
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In the case n = 210, we obtain
T210(Fq)× T30(Fq)× T6(Fq7)
∼−→T6(Fq35).









Although the computation required can be significant [vDGP+05, Section 6], the asymp-
totic compression obtained by this recursive chaining is attractive for applications with
high bandwidth requirements.
For example, van Dijk et al. adapt an electronic voting scheme of Kiayias and Yung
[KY02] to use an optimized parameterization of T30(Fq). Compared to a voting scheme
due to Damgärd and Jurik [DJ03], their torus based modification reduces the bandwidth
required by a factor of roughly 6.5 [vDGP+05, Appendix A]. This type of application,
where many torus elements will be transmitted, is ideally suited to the compression maps
given above.
5.9 Summary
We have done three things in this chapter. First, we presented a generalization of the
notion of rational parameterization, and explained how this generalization is used to con-
struct cryptosystems with compression better than the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems.
Second, we presented some parameterizations of stably rational tori. Finally, we cited a
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theoretical result that suggests that the technique described can be practicable in more
situations than the optimized implementation presented in [vDGP+05]. This completes
our coverage of extensions to the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems.
Chapter 6
Cryptography
In this chapter, we discuss the security of torus-based cryptosystems over finite fields.
We present torus-based analogues of standard cryptographic protocols, due to Rubin and
Silverberg [RS03], that motivate our security analysis. We consider the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq)
as a subgroup of the multiplicative group F×qn , and argue that torus-based cryptosystems
are as secure as traditional cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms in F×qn , for similar
parameter choices. We present the two attacks currently believed to be most applicable
to torus-based cryptosystems, before presenting an efficient probabilistic algorithm that
selects finite fields such that the tori T6(Fq) and T30(Fq) are secure against these attacks.
Finally, we present recent results of Granger and Vercauteren [GV05] on the security of
discrete logarithms in algebraic tori, and show that these results impact the security of
existing cryptosystems.
6.1 Torus-based cryptosystems
This section shows how Rubin and Silverberg [RS03, Section 6] use the maps developed
in Chapter 4 to realize public-key cryptosystems that require less communication than
traditional analogues.
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6.1.1 The CEILIDH protocols
For concreteness, we will only consider cryptosystems based on the two dimensional torus
T6, but the ideas presented extend naturally to any torus that has been explicitly bira-
tionally parameterized.
There are several parts to a torus-based cryptosystem. First, system-wide parameters
must be established; these include the choice of a torus T , of a base field k, and of birational
isomorphisms between the torus and affine space. Second, each user must generate a
public/private key pair, and publish the public information. Finally, the users of the
system must standardize protocols and implementation details. Since the choices of finite
fields and birational isomorphisms can be quite involved, we will abstract away some of
these details to simplify the presentation of the communication protocols.
We always choose k to be a finite field of prime order q, and we always let T be T6. Let `
be a prime divisor of Φ6(q); we work in the subgroup of T6(Fq) ⊂ F×q6 of order `. Distinguish
a generator α of this order ` subgroup to be the base element of the cryptosystem. Finally,
fix a birational parameterization
ρ : T6(Fq) −→ F2q
and its inverse
ψ : F2q −→ T6(Fq).
(The maps ρ and ψ of Example 4.7 are suitable birational parameterizations.)
The system-wide parameters, made public to all users of the cryptosystem, are the
torus T6(Fq), the field Fq, the generator α and its order `, and the maps ρ and ψ. The
compressed representation ρ(α) could be distributed instead of the generator α.
It is necessary to represent messages as elements of the torus T , and Rubin and Silver-
berg show how to do this [RS04b, Section 3.7]. First, represent the message in F2q as two
integers x, y between 0 and q − 1. If α is chosen such that the order ` of α satisfies
Φ6(q) = s · `
with s a small integer, then we expect that the output ψ(x, y) can be forced to be in the
subgroup generated by α by inserting some redundant bits into x and y and repeating
trials.
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With a message encoding and parameters decided, there are natural analogues to most
common cryptosystems.
6.1.2 Torus-based key agreement
This key agreement scheme is an analogue of the Diffie-Hellman key agreement [DH76].
Two users, Alice and Bob, use this protocol to share a secret between themselves, while
communicating only over an insecure channel.
1. Alice chooses a random integer exponent a in the range 1 6 a 6 ` − 1, and uses it to
compute the random power αa ∈ T6(Fq). She sends Bob the compressed representation
PA := ρ(α
a) ∈ F2q.
At the same time as Alice is choosing her exponent a, Bob chooses a random integer
exponent b in the range 1 6 b 6 ` − 1. He simultaneously uses it to send Alice the
compressed representation
PB := ρ(α
b) ∈ Fq2 .
2. Alice decompresses PB and exponentiates by a to compute
ψ(PB)
a = αab ∈ T6(Fq).
Simultaneously, Bob decompresses PA and exponentiates by b to compute
ψ(PA)
b = αab ∈ T6(Fq).
3. Alice and Bob share αab ∈ T6(Fq), or if they prefer, the compressed representation
ρ(αab) ∈ F2q.
6.1.3 Torus-based encryption
This encryption scheme is an analogue of ElGamal encryption; see, for example, [ElG85]
or [MvOV96, Chapter 8]. In this scenario, Bob wishes to send Alice a message over an
insecure channel, with the condition that only Alice can read the message.
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1. Alice must first generate a public/private key pair. She chooses a random integer




2. To encrypt his message, Bob first represents the message as an element M of the group
generated by α. He then chooses a random blinding exponent k in the range 1 6 k 6
`− 1, and computes the blind
γ = ρ(αk) ∈ F2q
and the blinded message
δ = ρ(Mψ(PubA)
k) ∈ F2q.
Bob sends Alice the pair (γ, δ).
3. To decrypt Bob’s cipher-text pair (γ, δ), Alice decompresses both and computes
ψ(δ)ψ(γ)−a = M(αa)k(αk)−a = M ∈ T6(Fq).
6.1.4 Torus-based digital signatures
This digital signature scheme is an analogue of ElGamal signatures; see, for example,
[ElG85] or [MvOV96, Chapter 11]. Alice wants to digitally sign a message to be sent to
Bob, where the message is represented as an element M in the group generated by α. To
do this, she needs a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}? −→ Z/`Z;
for more information on cryptographic hash functions, see [MvOV96, Chapter 9].
1. First, Alice needs to generate a public/private key pair, which she does exactly the same
way she does for the torus-based encryption scheme. She chooses a random integer
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2. To sign the message represented by M , Alice chooses a random integer k in the range
1 6 k 6 `− 1 and computes the blind
γ = ρ(αk) ∈ F2q.
She then computes the blinded value
δ = k−1(H(M)− aH(γ)) (mod `).
She sends Bob her signature on the message M , the pair (γ, δ).
3. To verify Alice’s signature pair (γ, δ) on the message represented by M , Bob computes
Sig := ψ(PubA)
H(γ)ψ(γ)δ ∈ T6(Fq)
and compares Sig with αH(M) ∈ T6(Fq). If Alice’s signature is well formed, then
Sig = ψ(PubA)
H(γ)ψ(γ)δ = (αa)H(γ)(αk)k
−1(H(M)−aH(γ)) = αH(M) ∈ T6(Fq).
Bob accepts Alice’s signature if and only if Sig and αH(M) are equal in the torus T6(Fq).
All the protocols presented depend on the DLP in the group T6(Fq). (Technically, the
analogues of Diffie-Hellman key agreement and ElGamal encryption depend on the Diffie-
Hellman problem, but for simplicity we will consider only the discrete logarithm problem.)
Definition 6.1. Let G be a finite group written multiplicatively. Given two elements, g
and h in G, with h ∈ 〈g〉, the discrete logarithm problem is to compute an integer x such
that
h = gx.
We call the triple (G, g, h) an instance of the discrete logarithm problem.
A complete review of the DLP from a cryptographic perspective is far beyond the
scope of this work, so we will be satisfied to say that the DLP in the multiplicative group
of finite fields is believed to be intractable for sufficiently large field sizes, and underlies
many cryptosystems used by industry. Comprehensive coverage can be found in [MvOV96,
Chapter 3].
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6.2 Discrete logarithms in F×qn
Let n be a fixed positive integer and let Fq be a finite field. Rubin and Silverberg claim
that their torus-based cryptosystems are essentially as secure as existing cryptosystems
based on the discrete logarithm problem [RS03, Section 6] [RS04b, Section 3.11] [GV05].
An instance of the DLP in F×qn can be reduced as follows. Suppose h ∈ F×qn is given,
and that g generates F×qn . We wish to compute x such that
h = gx,
ie the triple (Fqn , g, h) is an instance of the discrete logarithm problem.
Applying the norm maps NFqn/Fqd to g and h, for subfields Fqd ⊂ Fqn , yields a collection
of discrete logarithm problems{(
F×
qd




It follows that if these problems in the smaller fields Fqd can be solved, then the solutions






Since all the problems with d < n are in strictly smaller subfields, it is not unreasonable
to expect these problems to be computable.
The remaining modular information is determined by a DLP in the torus Tn(Fq), and,
as observed by Rubin and Silverberg, we expect this problem to be the most difficult.
If we consider only the order of the multiplicative group of the extension field Fqn , we
have that
|F×qn| = qn − 1.
Recalling the relation




and the fact that, by Theorem 2.2, the order of the norm-1 torus Td(Fq) is Φd(q), we see
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Unfortunately, the norm-1 torus orders Φd(q) may share repeated divisors, so we cannot
appeal to the Fundamental Theorem of Abelian Groups (Theorem 5.3) to establish an
isomorphism.
Throughout this chapter, we will be dogged by the fact that F×qn is not isomorphic to
the product of norm-1 tori
∏
d|n Td(Fq), but we will simplify matters by assuming that
the product of the repeated divisors is negligible when compared to the complete discrete
logarithm computation, which is a reasonable assumption in cryptographic applications.
The following result supports our assumption: Voskresenskii [Vos98, pp. 60-61] shows that





and Rubin and Silverberg [RS04b, Section 3.11] claim that the prime divisors of the orders
of the kernel and co-kernel of this homomorphism all divide n. This decomposition allows
us to conclude that the DLP in F×qn is at most as difficult as the discrete logarithm problems
in the collection of norm-1 tori {Td(Fq)}d|n.
Of course, if the DLP can be efficiently solved in F×qn , then the DLP in the torus Tn(Fq)
can be efficiently solved as well, since Tn(Fq) is a subgroup of F×qn .
Summarizing, we conclude that solving the DLP in the multiplicative group
F×qn
is equivalent to solving discrete logarithm problems in all the norm-1 tori
{Td(Fq)}d|n,
and that the most difficult of these problems is in the norm-1 torus
Tn(Fq).
6.3 Attacks on tori inherited from finite fields
Since Tn(Fq) is a subgroup of F×qn , any algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in
(subgroups of) F×qn is applicable. Randomized attacks that solve the DLP in F×qn come in
two flavours. The first flavour attacks the entire multiplicative group F×qn . The second
flavour attacks only a subgroup of Tn(Fq).
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6.3.1 Attacks on the entire multiplicative group
The best attack known that works on the entire multiplicative group of a finite field is the
Number Field Sieve [Gor93]. To express the running time of the Number Field Sieve, it is
necessary to embed the subgroup Tn(Fq) into the smallest possible finite field, say
Tn(Fq) ⊂ Fqs .
Then the heuristic asymptotic running time of the Number Field Sieve is bounded by
Lqs(1/3, 1.923),
where Ln(α, c) is the asymptotic function





which expresses how close a function is to polynomial in lnn. When α = 0, Ln is polyno-
mial:






on the other hand, when α = 1, Ln is fully exponential:






Thus, since Tn(Fq) ⊂ F×qn , the Number Field Sieve solves instances of the DLP in sub-
exponential (but super-polynomial) time. In fact, the smallest field Fqs that Tn(Fq) embeds
into is Fqn , by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. [BHV02, Lemma 1 correcting [Len97, Lemma 2.4]] The smallest field that
Tn(Fq) embeds into is Fqn, ie
Tn(Fq) 6⊂ Fqm
for all m|n with m < n.
Proof. Let ` be a prime dividing |Tn(Fq)| = Φn(q) but not dividing n. (For large q, such
an ` exists with high probability, and the proof can be modified in the exceptional cases.)
Since ` does not divide n, over the polynomial ring F`[X], we have
gcd(Xn − 1, nXn−1) = 1,
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and it follows that Xn − 1 has no repeated roots in the algebraic closure F̄`. Since




and since q is a root of Φn(X) in F`, we see that no other factor Φd(X) can have q as a
root in F`. Therefore,
Φd(q) 6≡ 0(mod `),
for all d|n with d < n, from which it follows that, for m|n with m < n,






Φd(q) 6≡ 0(mod `).
Since there is a subgroup of order ` in Tn(Fq), and this subgroup does not embed into any
subfield Fqm ⊂ Fqn , we conclude that the smallest field Tn(Fq) embeds into is Fqn .
Thus, in our analysis, Fqs = Fqn , and the Number Field Sieve requires running time
bounded by
Lqn(1/3, 1.923).
Therefore, to ensure that DLP instances are computationally infeasible, the field order
qn − 1
must be very large. Since our torus-based cryptosystems need the torus Tn to be rational,
and the only torus for which we have constructed a birational parameterization is T6, n
is a fixed small integer in our analysis. Therefore, the difficulty of computing discrete
logarithms is directly proportional to the field size q.
6.3.2 Attacks on a subgroup
The best attack known that works a the subgroup of Tn(Fq) is Pollard’s Rho Method
[Pol78, Tes98]. The running time of Pollard’s Rho Method is fully exponential in the size
of the target subgroup, but by using the Pohlig-Hellman reduction [PH78] to subgroups of
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where ` is the largest prime divisor of |Tn(Fq)| = Φn(q). Therefore, to ensure that DLP
instances are computationally infeasible, the largest prime
`|Φn(q)
must be very large. Ideally, a subgroup of Tn(Fq) of order ` close to Φn(q) is used, with `
just large enough to prevent Pollard’s Rho Method, and |Fqn| just large enough to prevent
the Number Field Sieve.
6.4 Selecting parameters to avoid attacks
Motivated by the two requirements of Section 6.3 that are needed to ensure the discrete
logarithm problem is computationally infeasible, we make the following definitions.
Definition 6.3. Let
`bits
be a positive integer such that the Pollard Rho algorithm is computationally infeasible in a
group of prime order `, with
` ≈ 2`bits .
Definition 6.4. Let
Nbits
be a positive integer such that the Number Field Sieve is computationally infeasible in finite
field multiplicative groups F× of order N , with
N ≈ 2Nbits .
For input security parameters `bits and Nbits, the following algorithms generate param-
eters for torus-based cryptosystems, such as CEILIDH and the system based on T30(Fq)
[vDW04]. (For the details of choosing parameters for the XTR cryptosystem, see [LV00].)
The first algorithm is a specialization of the method of Rubin and Silverberg [RS03,
Section 6].
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These choices provide heuristic security comparable to the RSA cryptosystem with 1024
bit modulus [LV00, Section 3].
2. Fix the torus degree n = 6, and let the maps parameterizing T6(Fq) be those of Example
4.7. To render the Number Field Sieve computationally infeasible, we need |F×q6| large.
Thus, we must find a prime q with
q6 ≈ 2Nbits ≈ 21024,
which means that q is approximately 170 bits. By the Prime Number Theorem [HW79,






≈ 6.3× 1048 ≈ 2162
primes of 170 bits, which means that it is feasible to generate primes of the desired size
by selecting random 170 bit integers and testing for primality.
3. To use the maps of Example 4.7, we need q ≡ 2(mod 9). By the Chebotarev Density







Thus choosing random primes until we find one congruent to 2 modulo 9 is feasible.
4. To render Pollard’s Rho method computationally infeasible, we also need that Φ6(q) is
divisible by a large prime ` of about 160 bits. Although there is no theoretical guarantee,
we expect about
2162(ln 161− ln 160) ≈ 3.6× 1046 ≈ 2154
primes q such that Φ6(q) has a large prime divisor of about 160 bits, and in practice
Φ6(q) can be partially factored and tested for primality efficiently.
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The preceding algorithm produces primes q, suitable for use with the torus T6(Fq), in
negligible time. Note that we do not fix the prime ` and generate a suitable q; this would
require finding a q such that ` is a root of Φ6(x) modulo q.
In the case of the stably rational torus system of van Dijk and Woodruff (Chapter 5),
which is based on the torus T30(Fq), the relative sparseness of suitable primes requires a
slightly more complicated scheme. We therefore present the following modification, also
due to Rubin and Silverberg [RS04b, Section 3.10].








Generating such primes randomly is easy, but the probability that a large prime ` divides
Φ30(q) is prohibitively small.
3. To increase the chances of finding a large prime ` dividing Φ30(q), choose a random
prime
p ≡ 1(mod 30)
with
p ≈ 230.
There are ϕ(30) = 8 elements 1 6 x 6 p − 1 that have multiplicative order exactly 30
modulo p. (If g generates Fp, then g
p−1
30 generates a cyclic subgroup of order 30, which
has 8 generators.) Denote the eight primitive thirtieth roots of unity
x1, . . . , x8.
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4. Choose random primes q ≈ 235 such that
q ≡ xi(mod p), for some 1 6 i 6 8.
(Again, the Chebotarev Density Theorem tells us this is feasible.)
Since each xi is a primitive thirtieth root of unity modulo p, it follows that
Φ30(q) ≡ Φ30(xi) ≡ 0(mod p).
We hope to find q such that Φ30(q)/p is divisible by a large prime factor `.
5. Because
Φ30(q)/p ≈ q8/p ≈ 2280/230 ≈ 2250,
and we want to find a prime ` ≈ 2160 dividing Φ30(q)/p, we expect to need to remove
factors between about 290 and 2100 from Φ30(q)/p. Rubin and Silverberg suggest that
the Elliptic Curve Method [HL87], optimized for factors in this range, can be used to
remove factors from Φ30(q)/p. Finally, we test to see if what remains after the factoring
has been done is a prime ` of size approximately 2160.
Rubin and Silverberg [vDW04, Section 5.5] claim that it is possible to generate primes
q ≈ 232 with the desired properties at the rate of one every several minutes, and also
that primes q ≈ 264 can be generated at the rate of one every several few hours. Since
system-wide parameters rarely need to be changed, these results demonstrate that these
cryptosystems can be instantiated with parameter choices believed to be secure.
Now that we have considered the best attacks known based on the interpretation of the
torus Tn(Fq) as a subgroup of F×qn , and shown how to select parameters such that these
attacks are believed to be computationally infeasible, we turn to a radical new attack based
on the representation of norm-1 tori.
6.5 Relation calculus for algebraic tori
In the previous sections, we chose prime fields Fq and argued that the norm-1 torus Tn(Fq)
over Fq was secure with respect to the best attacks known. In this section, we present new
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research of Granger and Vercauteren [GV05] that, in certain cases, shows that norm-1 tori
over extension fields Fpm are “not secure”. By “not secure”, we mean that the DLP can
be solved in time significantly less than the time required by Pollard’s Rho algorithm, but
not necessarily that real world parameter choices are weak. We emphasize that the new
results of Granger and Vercauteren do not cryptographically weaken the security of norm-
1 tori over prime fields; they only weaken tori over certain extension fields. The attack
does target tori over prime fields, by embedding them into lower dimensional rational tori
over extensions fields, but the attack runs in the same time as Pollard’s Rho Method
in the full torus. In practice, when a smaller subgroup of Tn(Fq) is used, Pollard’s Rho
Method is superior. Since XTR and CEILIDH are usually instantiated over prime fields,
these systems are not compromised. However, these results are significant because they
demonstrate that the structure of norm-1 tori, used to construct cryptosystems, can also
be exploited to destructive cryptographic advantage by a cryptanalyst.
The work of Granger and Vercauteren is an application of an idea of Gaudry [Gau].
Gaudry’s idea was to abstract the approaches of index calculus algorithms, attacking the
DLP in multiplicative groups of finite fields [Adl79] and the Jacobians of hyperelliptic
curves [ADH94, Gau00, The03], to a purely algebraic attack against arbitrary algebraic
groups, and in particular elliptic curve cryptosystems. We will give a brief sketch of
Gaudry’s relation calculus before describing specializations to norm-1 tori.
Suppose that G = (P ,⊗) is a group, written multiplicatively. If we distinguish two
elements P ∈ P and Q ∈ P, with Q ∈ 〈P 〉, then the DLP (G,P,Q) is well defined, ie we
must find x such that
Q = P x.
Our strategy is to distinguish a decomposition base
B = {P1, . . . , PM} ⊂ P ,







Such relations involve only P , Q, and the decomposition base elements Pi.
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will be over-determined, and with high probability a linear identity
QαP β = 1
can be computed. From this linear identity, the value of x can be computed, solving the
DLP.
Of course, this high level overview completely glosses over the technical details crucial
to all index calculus algorithms. In order to flesh out the skeleton, we must demonstrate
how several things are done. We must:
i. Explain how to choose a decomposition base B.
ii. Explain how to find relations of the form (6.1).
iii. Argue that finding “enough” relations is computationally feasible.
iv. Argue that solving the resulting linear system is computationally feasible.
Let us do these things for the torus T2(Fq).
6.6 Relation calculus for the torus T2(Fpm)
In this section, we describe an algorithm for solving discrete logarithms in the torus
T2(Fpm).
6.6.1 Algorithm description
Torus representation. By Hilbert’s Theorem 90 (Theorem 4.3), every element of
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with z ∈ Fp2m . We can make this representation explicit by fixing a basis for Fp2m over
Fpm . Let δ ∈ Fpm\Fp be a non-square, and represent Fp2m as
Fpm [γ]/(γ2 − δ),
with polynomial basis {1, γ}. With this representation, every element in T2(Fpm) save 1
can be written as x−γ
x+γ





: x ∈ Fpm
}
∪ {1}.
Observe that this representation makes clear that there are
pm + 1 = Φ2(p
m)
elements in T2(Fpm).
Decomposition base. With this description of the torus T2(Fpm) in mind, we define our





: a ∈ Fp
}
.
Observe that this representation makes clear that
|B| = p,
and thus our linear system will have p+ 2 unknowns, which means that we require about
p+ 3 relations.
Remark 6.5. As observed by Granger and Vercauteren [GV05, Section 4.2], if δ ∈ Fp,












a2 − 2aγ + γ2
a2 − γ2
=
a2 + δ − 2aγ
a2 − δ
∈ Fp2 ,
which means that this choice of δ makes the factor base a subset of a subvariety of T2(Fpm):
B ⊂ T2(Fp).
It follows that the only torus elements we could decompose over this B are elements in
T2(Fp), so that we would not be able to solve most discrete logarithm problems in T2(Fpm).
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Relation finding. We hope to find relations of the form
P jQk = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pm,
with each Pi in the factor base B. (Remark 6.6 explains why we seek relations incorporating
exactly m elements.)
Since the operation ⊗ in the group T2(Fpm) is just multiplication in the finite field, we
hope to solve
P jQk = P1P2 · · ·Pm.
Representing P jQk by















Since we want the Pi to be in the decomposition base B, the ai are unknowns in Fp.
Granger and Vercauteren [GV05, Section 4.3] show how to solve for the ai. Their method
exploits the symmetry of the set {a1, . . . , am} to obtain a system M of m linear equations
over Fp. When a solution to the system M exists, it may correspond to a decomposition
of R of the form (6.2). The potential decomposition is then checked to see if a relation has
been found.
Remark 6.6. The reason we seek relations incorporating exactly m elements of the factor
base is because elements of Fpm are represented as polynomials of degree less than m:
the system M consists of m equations relating the roots a1, . . . , am to each other, with
respect to a polynomial basis {1, t, . . . , tm−1} of Fpm . Since there are m basis elements
{1, t, . . . , tm−1}, the linear system yields relations when there are m unknowns a1, . . . , am,
or equivalently m elements P1, . . . , Pm.
Analysis. Checking to see if a relation decomposes over the decomposition base B, and
computing the coefficients ai in (6.2) can be done relatively easily. The crucial question is,
“How long does it take to find enough relations?” (Recall that “enough relations” is O(p)
relations.)
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Granger and Vercauteren [GV05, Section 4.4] provide the following estimate. They show










under reasonable assumptions we expect one in every m! relations we try to decompose over
the factor base. The theorem that accounts for the computation required by the “relation
decomposition stage” follows.
Theorem 6.7. [GV05, Theorem 1] The expected running time of the T2 algorithm to
compute discrete logarithms in T2(Fpm) is
O
(
m!p(m3 +m2 log p) +m3p2
)
operations in Fp.
Theorem 6.7 shows that the T2 algorithm performs best when
m! = p,
which is equivalent to
m logm ≈ p.
In this case, Granger and Vercauteren show that the T2 algorithm runs in expected time
Lpm (1/2, c) ,
for some positive constant c. Cryptographically meaningful comparison with the expected
running time of the Number Field Sieve, is not possible at this time, because the constant
c is not well understood, and no comparable reference implementations exist. Moreover,
for some parameters, the Number Field Sieve runs in time Lp2m (1/2, c
′). Therefore our
assumption that the number field sieve runs in time Lp2m(1/3, 1.923), which is the most
conservative security assumption, may incorrectly indicate that the Number Field Sieve is
superior to the attack of Granger and Vercauteren.
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6.6.2 Cryptographic significance
To demonstrate the feasibility of their algorithm, Granger and Vercauteren include compu-
tational data [GV05, Section 4.4]. Using an unoptimized Magma [BCP97] implementation,
they assessed the practicality of their algorithm in cases where it is likely to be feasible.
Since we require O(p) relations, we must be able to find a kernel vector in a system
of dimension O(p); with this requirement in mind, the authors assumed that the linear
algebra is computationally feasible only when p 6 223.
Table 6.1 summarizes some of Granger and Vercauteren’s feasibility results [GV05,
Table 1]. In the table, the size of the torus is constant across each row, and • marks the
combinations of p and m that can be attacked with the Magma implementation.
m
|Fp2m| |T2(Fpm)| 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
2200 2100 • • • • • • • • • • •
2300 2150 • • • • • • • • •
2400 2200 • • • • • • •
2500 2250 • • • •
2600 2300
2700 2350
Table 6.1: The Magma T2 implementation is feasible for some values of p and m.
In addition, the authors show that if the values of p and m chosen are even feasible
with their Magma implementation, the T2 algorithm in the whole torus T2(Fpm) outper-
forms Pollard’s Rho method in a subgroup of Fp2m of order 2160. Thus their algorithm is
cryptographically significant, in the sense that any improvement on Pollard’s Rho method
is a potential weakness.
The existence of an algorithm superior to Pollard’s Rho in even a single instance shows
that the structure of norm-1 tori can also be used by a potential cryptanalyst, and that
some care must be exercised when designing cryptosystems. As an example, note that in
the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems,
T6(Fq) ⊂ T2(Fq3),
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so that the T2 attack applies with m = 3; however, as shown in Table 6.1, there are no
field sizes such that the T2 attack is both practical and superior to Pollard’s Rho method.
However, in the system based on T30(Fq) of Chapter 5, we have
T30(Fq) ⊂ T2(Fq15),
and the field sizes that can be handled by the Magma implementation are approaching
those used in cryptographic applications. Ultimately, however, the LUC [SL93], XTR
[LV00], and CEILIDH [RS03] cryptosystems over a prime field are not compromised by the
T2 attack of Granger and Vercauteren.
We conclude that the T2 attack is interesting in theory, but does not directly damage
the torus-based cryptosystems we have studied.
6.7 Relation calculus for the torus T6(Fpm)
We also sketch Granger and Vercauteren’s attack on the the torus T6(Fpm) [GV05, Section
5].
6.7.1 Algorithm description
For concreteness, fix a finite field Fp with p ≡ 2(mod 9), and let
Fpm = Fp[t]/(f(t))
be represented by the polynomial basis{
1, t, . . . , tm−1}.
We use the rational maps developed in Example 4.7 to parameterize the torus T6(Fpm).
Recall that these maps exploit the field representations Fp2m = Fpm(x) with x2 +x+1 = 0,
and Fp3m = Fpm(y) with y3 − 3y + 1 = 0.
The elements of T6(Fpm) are represented via the map
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Choose the decomposition base
B = {ψ(at, 0) : a ∈ Fp} =
{
1 + (at)y + (1− (at)2)x
1 + (at)y + (1− (at)2)x2
}
.
Observe that the more natural choice {ψ(a, 0) : a ∈ Fp} is a subset of the subvariety
T6(Fp) ⊂ T6(Fpm); the B defined above generates “enough” of T6(Fpm) for the relation
calculus to be successful.
We seek relations of the form
P jQk = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ P2m,
with each Pi in the factor base B. We search for relations incorporating exactly 2m elements
because T6(Fpm) is 2m dimensional over the ground field Fp; another way to say the same
thing is that each element Pi represents a single degree of freedom in the 2m-dimensional
torus ResFpm/Fp T6.
Representing
P jQk = ψ(r1, r2) =
1 + r1y + r2(y
2 − 2) + (1− r21 − r22 + r1r2)x
1 + r1y + r2(y2 − 2) + (1− r21 − r22 + r1r2)x2
∈ T6(Fpm),




1 + (ait)y + (1− (ait)2)x
1 + (ait)y + (1− (ait)2)x2
)
=
1 + r1y + r2(y
2 − 2) + (1− r21 − r22 + r1r2)x
1 + r1y + r2(y2 − 2) + (1− r21 − r22 + r1r2)x2
. (6.3)
Upon expansion and symmetrization, (6.3) yields a system of 3 non-linear equations
over Fpm , or 3m non-linear equations over Fp (in 2m unknowns) [GV05, Section 5.3].
Granger and Vercauteren solve this non-linear system with standard Gröbner basis tech-
niques [Fau99, Fau02], and use these solutions to find relations between P and Q.
6.7.2 Cryptographic significance
Rather than detail the entire T6 algorithm, we will be satisfied to consider its cryptographic
significance. Unfortunately, the Gröbner basis computations needed are sensitive to slight
changes to the input, making their running time difficult to estimate. In response, Granger
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and Vercauteren estimate the running time of their algorithm using several pessimistic
heuristics concerning the efficiency of the Gröbner basis computations. They also tested a
prototype implementation in Magma. They conclude that their algorithm is theoretically
superior to Pollard’s Rho method when
m = 5,
even though it is only computationally feasible when
|Fpm| 6 2600.
They also claim an improvement in running time (measured in seconds) by a factor of more
than 220 over Pollard’s Rho Method in a subgroup of order 2160 in several cases [GV05,
Table 2].
Granger and Vercauteren show that their T6 algorithm does not impact the security
of the XTR and the CEILIDH cryptosystems over prime fields. However, the attack does
apply to cryptosystems constructed using the torus T30(Fq), because
T30(Fp) ⊂ T6(Fp5).
In addition, it applies to a proposed extension of XTR to fields of the form Fp6` [LKY+01].
These results have challenged the security of discrete logarithm cryptosystems in extension
fields of degree thirty, although, at this time, the algorithm is not feasible in fields of
cryptographic size. Even so, Granger and Vercauteren have shown the discrete logarithm
problem in T30(Fpm) to be less difficult than previously believed.
6.8 Summary
In this section, we presented the protocols of Rubin and Silverberg for torus-based cryp-
tography. Motivated by these protocols, we discussed the two attacks inherited from finite
fields most likely to attack torus-based cryptosystems, and showed how to choose param-
eters that are believed to make these attacks infeasible. In addition, we discussed new
algorithms specific to algebraic tori and showed that they are cryptographically relevant.
Based on the results of Granger and Vercauteren, we believe that:
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• Cryptosystems based on the torus T6(Fp) over a prime field of order p, such as
the XTR and CEILIDH cryptosystems, are secure when instantiated with correctly
chosen parameters.
• Cryptosystems based on the torus T30(Fq), such as those due to van Dijk, Woodruff,
et al. presented in Chapter 5, may be insecure, and further work must be done to
assess the practicality of the T6 algorithm in T6(Fp5) for cryptographic field sizes.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis presented algebraic tori and their applications to cryptography. We gave an
elementary presentation of norm-1 tori, and used this understanding to interrogate the
pioneering work of Rubin and Silverberg interpreting the LUC and XTR cryptosystems
geometrically. In addition, we showed that insight into the rational geometry of norm-
1 tori leads to the simplified CEILIDH cryptosystem, and explained that the improved
stably rational cryptosystems of van Dijk, Woodruff, and co-authors, generalize the rational
property exploited by CEILIDH. Finally, we showed that the new attacks of Granger and
Vercauteren exploiting the rational geometry of norm-1 tori must be considered when
designing cryptosystems that work in small degree extension fields.
While the constructive and destructive uses of algebraic tori in cryptography presented
in this thesis are significant, there remain many open questions in the field. Some possi-
bilities for future work include:
Establishing Voskresenskii’s Conjecture. If Voskresenskii’s Conjecture on the ratio-
nality of norm-1 tori (Conjecture 4.2) is true, then in theory any compression ratio can be
attained, because for any positive constant C there exists n such that
n/ϕ(n) > C.
Of course, for each rational torus, explicit birational maps parameterizing it would be
needed, and constructing such maps might not be easy. However, it is possible that the
proof of the conjecture suggests how to construct the requisite parameterizations. There-
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fore, the “grand prize”of torus-based cryptography must be Voskresenskii’s Conjecture.
Unfortunately, the theory of norm-1 tori is deep, and there is no reason to believe the
conjecture will be settled in the foreseeable future.
Parameterizing the torus quotient T210/(S2 × S3 × S5 × S7). Rubin and Silverberg
proved (Theorem 3.21) that the symmetric maps, which are the natural extension of the
XTR trace map, do not parameterize the quotient T30/ (S2 × S3 × S5). Their proof relied
on a computation specific to the torus T30. Although Theorem 3.21 suggests otherwise, it
is possible that the symmetric maps parameterize the quotient T210/ (S2 × S3 × S5 × S7).
Further investigation into this case, and perhaps proof that the quotient variety XF
qd
is
not rational for various fields Fqn and subfields Fqd , would further our understanding of
the LUC and XTR cryptosystems.
Investigating lossy compression. Rubin and Silverberg [RS04b, Section 6.7] claim to
have constructed s : 1 rational maps
T30(Fq) −→ F8q,
with s a small integer.
Such maps could be used to implement a lossy compression scheme representing ele-
ments of T30(Fq) by elements in F8q × {1, 2, . . . , s}, and might be more efficient than the
stably rational cryptosystems of Chapter 5. Optimization of such maps, and a better un-
derstanding of the cryptographic repercussions of this compact representation, would be
a valuable contribution to the field of torus-based cryptography. For example, the “rela-
tion calculus” of Gaudry, used by Granger and Vercauteren, does not rely on a concept
of unique factorization. Can this calculus be used with s : 1 rational parameterizations of
algebraic tori?
Improving the attacks of Granger and Vercauteren. The bottle-neck in the T6
algorithm of Granger and Vercauteren is the Gröbner basis computation necessary for
testing if a relation is found. They analyzed [GV05, Section 5.3] the bases computed, and
empirically determined that the bases had special form. Specializing their algorithm to
exploit the form of the equations solved in the relation finding step might strengthen the
already promising results presented.
Using norm-1 tori over binary fields. Although this thesis considers only construc-
tions over fields of odd order, the theory of norm-1 tori presented is unchanged over fields
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of characteristic 2. Is it possible that torus-based cryptography can be made more efficient
over binary fields? How do the attacks of Granger and Vercauteren compare to optimized
discrete logarithm computations in binary fields?
Using norm-1 tori in other settings. The concept of norm is ubiquitous in math-
ematics; for instance, number fields and ideal class groups have well-defined norm maps.
Therefore, we suggest a speculative research programme exploring cryptographic applica-
tions of (analogues of) norm-1 tori over different structures. Such an alternative structure
could be a field, but could be also be a more general object, such as a ring.
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11:263–268, 1999.
[Wei58] A. Weil. The field of definition of a variety. American Journal of Mathematics,
78:509–524, 1958.
